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PART I — INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES

INVESTMENT, SPECULATION AND GAMBLING
There are probably no words more misunder-
stood than the three terms: investment, speculation and
gambling. They confuse the financial authority and the
man in the street. Their meanings are vague and shift-
ing, both in the talk of the market-place and in trea-
tises on investment. Yet the writer believes that rea-
sonable distinctions can be made, and such are essential,
for nowhere is the jumble of meanings more distressing
than in connexion with investment trusts. This paper
treats of investment trusts as mechanisms of investment,
and definitely excludes superficially similar schemes
which mask speculative or garrbling ventures with a phra-
seology stolen from worthier enterprises.
The investor
Investment is the commitment of funds to an
economic undertaking for the purpose of securing an an-
nual return by reason of the use of these funds in pro-

2duct ion, under such conditions that the premium paid for
risk does not outweigh the true investment return. The
investor wants assurance that his principal will remain
intact, yet at the same time he desires as large a return
as is consistent with the regularity of that income and
with the security of his principal, if his principal
were absolutely safe, the investor would get the pure in-
terest of the economist. But there is no such thing as
a riskless investment and the return to the investor al-
ways includes, in addition to the true interest, a pre-
mium for risk. The greater the risk assumed, the greater
the jeopardy of the principal; and as the mind of one
purchasing securities becomes focused on extraordinary
gains in disregard of the integrity of his principal,
that person ceases to be an investor.
The Speculator
There is next, the speculator. In some re-
spects he resembles the investor. m gaining his end,
as defined above, the investor must act with reasoned
judgment, but so also must the speculator. The investor
always places his funds in a productive enterprise; so
likewise may the speculator. But real differences are
apparent. The speculator may put his money into a pro-
ductive enterprise, but in making his commitment he ac-

3cepts an unusual hazard; a risk which is balanced in his
mind by the promise of exceptional return, but which at
the same time endangers the safety of his principal.
This shouldering of large risk is speculation.
There are other things that mark the specula-
tor. A person may not put his funds definitely into pro-
duction, but may simply trade in securities; buying low
with hope of selling high; deriving his gain or suffering
loss through the exigencies of price change. The specu-
lator acts rationally; he consciously assumes the risks
of uncertain enterprises, going in with his eyes open and
weighing carefully his chances. He is no fool and does
not assume risks of a magnitude unwarranted by his eco-
nomic status.
From this description of the speculator's
activities a definition may be constructed. Speculation
is (1) the placing of funds in an economic undertaking
where the lure of large reward for risk-bearing is para-
mount to the investment motive of moderate, regular re-
turn and safety of principal, or (2) the buying and sell-
ing of securities with the object of securing a gain
through favorable price changes; in either instance the
handler of the funds consciously taking chances that he
has carefully weighed, and in neither instance accepting
4ft
4a hazard unwarranted by his financial status.
The Gambler
Last of all comes the gambler. He hopes to
make gains out of the same situations as does the specu-
lator, but the gambler is irrational. He is "above all,
the blind chance-taker • • • • The gambler either cannot
/
or does not calculate the chance of success or failure."
And there is one more distinction. The gambler often
plays the fool, taking risks which his financial strength
does not warrant, wild chances that may result in his im-
poverishment, leaving him unable to care for those to
whom he owes a social duty*
A formal definition may read: gambling is
(1) the placing of funds in securities which represent a
high degree of economic risk or which hold the lure of
favorable price-change, but in either instance trusting
blindly to fortune, or (2) bearing a risk out of all pro-
portion to the financial position of the person making
the commitment*
THE THEORY OF DIVERSIFICATION
Pure Interest and the Risk Premium
Pure interest and a premium for risk have
been mentioned as comprising the investment return. The
first is simply a price resulting from the action of the
Kirshman, J. E. Principles of Investment, p. 18-9

5world demand for savings upon the world supply; and the
market rate changes as these determining forces change.
The second is in the nature of an insurance premium to
compensate for probable loss of principal. There is an
element of risk in every investment, and if this risk
could be calculated with precision, it would be possible
to fix a risk premium for each type of investment which
would exactly offset all losses of principal. In other
words, if in a given type of investment, one $100-unit
in each fifty $lOO-units would lose its entire value an-
i
nually, each unit would carry a 2% risk premium to
counteract the inevitable loss. Of course, an investment
fund would have to be large enough to purchase fifty
units, and these units would have to be widely distri-
buted among the industries offering this type of invest-
ment, in order that the so-called law of averages would
work itself out. "Under these conditions the net return
to the investor would be exactly the pure interest. The
excess of risk premium above pure interest would exactly
offset the losses of principal. There would be no en-
i
hancement of principal, no loss of principal."
Diversification
This leads to the principle of diversification
which is basic to the investment trust device. It has
2Dewing, A. S. The Financial Policy of Corporations ,
p. 1177

long been observed that investors of large funds distrib-
ute those funds among many enterprises. The true sig-
nificance of this practice, as explained above, is that
enough risk premiums are assembled to counterbalance the
inevitable losses.
There is a common fallacy in connexion with
the distribution of investment funds that may well be
taken up here. Some people have the idea that any sort
of haphazard distribution is conducive to safety. This
position is untenable. If a man with five-thousand dol-
lars places one-fifth of his fund in each of the follow-
ing: the shares of a risky oil venture, the stock of a
new public utility holding company, the first-mortgage
bonds of a transcontinental railroad, the obligations of
a sizeable mid-Western city, and the preferred stock of
the little local shoe factory, there is no guarantee that
risk premiums will offset losses -- the risk factor is
not uniform. On the other hand, if he should purchase
the first lien bonds of five large public utilities, with
those obligations carrying equivalent risk factors, there
would be a real appeal to the so-called law of averages.
There is also one other aspect to the theory
of diversification, excellently stated by Professor Dewing.
He says, "Were it possible to divide a fund irto a vast
#
7number of separate units, and place these units in every
industry in the country and in proportion to the industry *«
contribution to the national wealth, then the fund would
increase or decrease in proportion to the increase or de-
crease of national wealth • • • • moreover, the wider the
distribution, the wore certain it is that the fund, as a
whole, will not be extinguished for it is inconceivable
that our economic life should be extinguished without the
extinction of the race."
INVESTMENT PROFIT
The Return to Skilled Management
Pure interest and a premium for risk have
been discussed as elements in the investment return.
There is possible yet another — economic profit. Mod-
ern economic theory has recognised the reward of manage-
ment as a proper division of the national dividend. In
the ordinary conduct of a business undertaking, this
share represents payment for the manager's contribution
of the vital elements of organisation, direction and
judgment. The investor of funds has the opportunity to
exercise true business foresight, and in so doing to
secure from his commitments a true business profit — a
gain in excess of the pure interest return and the risk
premium.
^Dewing, A. S. op. cit., p. 1190-1

8This securing of an investment profit has to
do with the estimation of the risk factor. In numerous
instances the market estimate of the worth of an invest-
ment does not coincide with the true value of that in-
vestment. It is either too high or too low. Only the
investor of unusual insight and far-reaching knowledge
can detect the discrepancy. If a certain security yields
5.4$ at the current price, and the interest rate is 4$,
the premium for risk is apparently 1.4%. But if the true
status of the investment is such that a yield of 5% is
adequate, there remains an excess gain of 0.4$. Herein
lies the source of true business profit. The skilled in-
vestor discovers this differential and secures the extra
return by purchase of the undervalued security. Gener-
ally speaking, this profit is not a permanent element.
The forces of the market tend eventually to bring market
prices into line with intrinsic values. (There are,
however, some securities that seem to be permanently
overvalued or undervalued; such condition being due to
long standing prejudice in the mind of the investing
public or to artificial demand as in the case of legals.)
The discerning investor sees the opportunity before it
is apparent to the market as a whole; he beats the market
in a real sense. The investor here exercises the same

kind of judgment as does the manager of some industrial
enterprise who sounds conditions in his own field so that
his endeavors may be in harmony with basic economic forces
The investor who can with frequency make similar judg-
ments will secure substantial profits. On the other hand,
the discriminating investor will avoid those securities
wherein the market has underestimated the risk factor,
and so avoid incurring losses.
It is to be observed that investment profit
or loss may be thought of in terms of yield or in terms
o^ capital value. A security is selling for $1000. The
annual income from it is $75, a yield of 7.5$. Assume
this security to be undervalued, that the yield should be
normally about 6$. Eventually the forces of the market
will tend to fix the price of this security at its normal
value, about $1250. The purchaser of the security at
$1000 could take his profit in either of two ways. He
could continue to receive his $75 annually, figuring his
yearly investment profit to be $15, or he could sell out
for $1250, thus making a single profit from capital ap-
preciation. A reverse process would occur in the case of
an overvalued security.
Opportunities of the Cycle
Opportunity for profit-taking in investment

is closely linked with the periodic ups and downs of in-
dustry the familiar business cycle. Two things con-
nected with the cycle are important to the investor seek-
ing profit: the movements of the interest rate and the
psychological attitude of the business and financial
world. The upward swing of the cycle is marked, in the
first place,, by a rising interest rate, and secondly by
the prevalence of business optimism engendered by large
profits and increasing sales. On the downward course of
the cycle the reverse is true. The interest rate falls,
while the world of business and finance is pessimistic.
Considering the upward movement of the busi-
ness cycle, it is obvious that insofar as the return on
an investment is pure interest, the market price of that
investment will tend to fall. Assume that a person buys
for $1000 a 4% bond devoid of risk at a time when the in-
terest rate is also 4%. He would be paying precisely
what the bond is worth. But if some months later a busi-
ness boom should send the rate to Q%, the price of his
bond would tend to drop to $500.
To take a rrore likely case, assume a 6% bond
with a yield composed of 4$ pure interest and 2% compensa-
tion for risk, selling at $1000. Improving business con-
ditions send the interest rate to 6%, If the estimation

of the business hazard does not change, the bond will fall
in price to about $750. But brighter prospects for busi-
ness generate an optimism that tends to underestimate the
full extent of economic risk. If in this instance, the
risk, while actually one in fifty, should be adjudged one
in a hundred, the premium would drop to !%• This decline
in the risk premium would in some degree offset the rise
in the rate of interest. The market price of the bond in
question would thus tend to settle around $860.
Stocks and Bonds
It will readily be seen that increase in the
interest rate and underestimation of risk are counter-
acting influences. Furthermore, it is apparent that
securities whose return is composed largely of pure in-
terest will tend to fall in price, while those carrying
a considerable risk factor will tend to advance. In
other words, high-grade bonds will tend to recede in
price as the business cycle moves upward, while securities
of considerable risk( especially common stocks )will tend to
experience price enhancement. It is also evident that
precisely opposite conditions obtain when the cycle is on
the down-grade. The interest rate drops, risks are over-
estimated! bond values rise, stock prices fade.
Investors able to discern intrinsic values can
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take advantage of these conditions. As the bottom of the
cycle is neared, high-priced bonds should be sold and the
proceeds put into undervalued stocks. At the top of the
cycle this process should be reversed, inflated stocks
should be sold and high-grade bonds of distant maturity
acquired.
But the astute management of an investment
fund means something more than profit-taking. It was
remarked that the investor is much concerned with keeping
his original commitment intact. There is no such thing
as an investment that can be put away and forgotten. To
put, say half a million dollars into various enterprises
and be able ten years later to liquidate for an amount
equal in purchasing power to the original sum requires
knowledge, insight and ceaseless vigilance. Individual
corporations grow old and die: whole industries rise and
fall. Sound investment management demands that the invest-
ment fund be continually shifted so that the commitments
shall be always with strong corporations and in "industries
which produce goods or services so much demanded by the
contemporary social order that their market price remains
consistently above the cost of production."
Summary and Transition
These matters of diversification and manage-
ewing, A. S. op. cit., p. 1227
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ment may be summarised briefly. Diversification means
the distribution of the investment fund among securities
carrying a like risk premium and sufficiently numerous
really to compensate for hazards assumed; or, theoreticair
to distribute the fund so widely and completely that the
investment return will coincide with the economic for-
tunes of the nation or of the world. Management refers
to the application of skill and knowledge to the securing
of a profit by taking advantage of discrepancies between
market prices and true values; and also shifting the in-
vestment fund in such manner as to preserve the original
fund intact despite the vicissitudes of industry and the
varying value of the dollar.
It is evident that the effective diversifica-
tion requires an extremely large investment fund, and
that superior management implies the mastery of a vast
and intricate science. The practice of investment as a
science is not an occupation for the man in the street
with his little store of savings. The wealthy investor
is taken care of. He can invest on a large scale and can
command expert management. Yet the small investor is
definitely in the field and he wants all that he can get.
The solution is unmistakable. If individuals in con-
siderable numbers pool their resources, a large fund may
be created; and a large fund means diversification,

14
skilled management, and greater return.
The demand for an investment device that will
provide these advantages of large-scale investment has
been met by schemes generally known as investment trusts.
"Broadly, the investment trust may be defined as an organ-
isation for the collective investment of the funds of
numerous individuals in numerous securities." The two
principles basic to its operation are those that have just
been discussed -- diversification and skilled management.
This definition is a very general one. It will be seen
later that many projects designated as investment trusts
do not adhere strictly to these principles, and also that
the term "investment trust" is somewhat of a misnomer.
But this simple definition is adequate for the time being.
^Fowler, J. F. American investment Trusts, p. 20

PART II — THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
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GENERAL
As far as anyone knows, the Societe GlneYale
de Belgique, founded at Brussels in 1822, was the orig-
nal investment trust". But it was not on the Continent
that the first extensive development took place. Great
Britain is the true home of the investment trust. It
was there that this financial device first became numer-
ous;* first attained an important and permanent place in
the financial structure. It was there that organisation,
managerial technique and investment standards were fur-
thest advanced.
In describing the British experience, refer-
ence is made at some points to Scottish trusts and at
others to English trusts. No real distinction is intended^
Development in the two countries was practically simul-
taneous and closely parallel. What is said of one applies
to the other.
7Federal Reserve Bulletin 62, (January, 1921)
II
r
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The Economic Stimulus
The rise of the investment trust in Great
Britain is not hard to explain. The basic economic fac-
tor lay in the foreign trade situation which grew up
after the Napoleonic Wars. Domestic production was enor-
mously increased and a great excess of goods flowed out
in the export trade. A large favorable balance was con-
stantly maintained, turning Great Britain into a great
creditor nation and necessitating the export of capital.
The increasing productivity of British industry brought
prosperity and the saving classes accumulated a large
surplus for investment. The home market could not absorb
it all. Furthermore, the yields of foreign securities
were extremely high and alluring speculative possibilities
abounded. Of no small consequence was the fact that the
rate on British Consols declined as political conditions
became stabilised and the government grew strong. In 1860
when the first Scottish trust was formed, the rate on
British Consols was about 5%, while the obligations of
foreign governments yielded upwards of 5$, and strong
private enterprises abroad, such as large railroads,
yielded even more. Lastly may be mentioned the vigorous
policy of colonial expansion which focused the minds of
the Eritish people on the possibilities of great develop-
6 Federal Reserve Bulletin 1168, (November, 1920)
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ments overseas.
Historical Sketch
Throughout the nineteenth century enormous
sums of British capital flowed to foreign fields. From
the early years down to the 1860 f s investment was hap-
hazard, individualistic and highly speculative. A
number of the wealthier capitalists were able to purchase
adequate investment information and to diversify their
holdings, but the middle-class investor of moderate means
could' do neither, and, possessed by the gambling fever of
the times, blindly flung his savings into one or two en-
terprises on the basis of glowing circulars and hopeful
expectations. The British public paid a heavy price.
Default followed default; panic succeeded panic. Losses
were tremendous; thousands were ruined.
It began to dawn in the minds of investors
that the purchase of foreign securities must be based on
thorough analysis, and that some form of diversification
was desirable. The investment trust arose to meet the
need. In 1863 appeared the London Financial Association
and the International Society. At about the same time
investment trusts were being started in Scotland. For
the next twenty years development was slow, scarcely more
than a dozen investment trusts being listed on the London

Stock Exchange at the end of that time.
In the decade from the early 80' s to the
early 90 ! s the speculative frenzy broke out again. The
investment trusts greatly extended their activities and
increased rapidly in number. Unfortunately, this expansion
was largely along unsound lines. There was little re-
striction upon trust management; fraud, incompetence and
recklessness crept in. The condition of many organisations
was shaky, and the successive shocks of the Baring crisis
of 1890 and the American panic of 1893 hit the British
trusts hard. The American panic was disastrous for the
British trusts because of their large holdings of Ameri-
can securities. "The two situations combined made it
necessary for many British and Scottish trusts to indulge
in a careful revaluation of their securities .... The
result of such a general revaluation of investments was
both unpleasant and salutary. 1*
With the lessons of the past in mind, the
British trusts entered a period of sound development
which extended down to the beginning of the World War.
During these years there was evolved a technique of man-
agement and organisation which secured the investment
trust a place of importance in the scheme of domestic fi-
nance, and made British practice the international stand-
~*
Grayson, T. J. Investment Trusts , p. 14
*Ibid., p. 17
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ard. The World War interrupted all progress. Many
trusts sold their foreign holdings and put the proceeds
in government obligations; others turned their securities
over to the government in exchange for the guarantee of a
fixed return. Despite hard times, the trusts came through
in good shape, and recent statistics"
3 indicate that they
are more than holding their own.
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
The Form of Organisation
Up to this point no explanation has been
given why this particular device should be called a
tttrust. M The reason is apparent. "The early British in-
vestment trusts were in truth just what the name implies
— informal associations of individuals entrusting their
investments to one person[sometimes to several persons)
who occupied a fiduciary position." The investment asso-
ciates would designate certain persons of supposed in-
tegrity and financial ability as trustees, receiving in
return certificates of participation entitling them to a
share in the trust fund proportionate to their contribu-
tions and a like share in such investment return as the
trustees would be able to earn. Usually the trust fund
would be limited to a fixed sum. If the fund was over-
subscribed, a second, but legally distinct, trust would
^Layton, O. C • 8 Barrons 11, (May 21, 1928)
6 Fowler, J. F. op. cit., p. 4

be created bearing the same name as the first and uti-
lising the same trustees. The life of these trusts was
limited, liquidation taking place automatically at the
end of fifteen or twenty years.
Things changed in 1879 with the passage of
the Companies Acts, which in effect established a general
corporation law for the United Kingdom. The investment
trusts were brought within the scope of the act, and
since that time have assumed the form of limited liability
companies, though they still continue to be designated as
"trusts It is interesting to note that it is the lack
of uniform requirements of incorporation that has raised
the issue of public regulation of investment trusts in
this country.
The Evolution of Management
As noted above, the managements of many
British trusts were guilty of numerous financial sins
during the developmental period. These managements were
frequently invested with sweeping powers, and little su-
pervision was exercised over their activities. As long
as profits were forthcoming, no questions were asked.
In a time of bubbling optimism and frenzied speculation,
untried and untrained men were entrusted with the cus-
tody and investment of great funds. It is no wonder that
•>
<
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evil results ensued. Fraud was common. Typical activi-
ties were: the use of trust funds for personal specula-
tion, the passing of non-cumulative dividends to cut a
melon later for the benefit of the management shares, the
lending of money to the unworthy enterprises of friends.
Worst of all was the incompetency. Struck with the gam-
bling fever, commitments were made to unsound enterprises,
diversification was ignored, new ventures of a doubtful
cast were financed, controlling interests were purchased,
and some trust managements actually undertook to operate
business enterprises.
How organisations so conducted fared in the
crashing markets of the 90 f s is easy to infer. But the
investment trusts did not pass from the financial scene.
There were a few reasonably well-managed trusts and a
goodly number of the others were able to save themselves
by drastic revaluation of securities and general reorgani-
sation of administration. The British investing public
learned one thing: "Management is primary. Its char-
acter, antecedents, responsibility and investment experi-
ence can make or unmake any investment trust."
Since that time conditions have been reversed.
The outstanding characteristic of the British trusts has
been the excellence of their management. The direction
7Winston, A. British Investment Trust Experience and
Its Lessons For America. 51 Awn»n«* o«.flj (dqc u ^
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of the trusts has been in the hands of men of integrity
and ability; men who are conscious of the responsibility
of their office; to whom the management of a portfolio is
an applied science; who recognise that investment is not
speculation nor gambling, nor the promotion and operation
of commercial enterprises • A. technique and tradition of
good management has grown up in Great Britain.
British Principles
Years of experience have yielded certain
valid principles which are usually incorporated, ex-
plicitly or tacitly, in the policies of the better trusts.
They may be listed as follows:
(1) World-wide distribution of the portfolio *
— This provides geographical diversification. Poor con-
ditions in one part of the world are likely to be counter-
balanced by extraordinary prosperity in some other part.
It also enables the trusts to take advantage of opportuni-
ties to secure a true investment profit. Excellent oppor-
tunities for extra return lie in the fact that demands for
capital are constantly springing up in widely scattered
and remote regions where funds are scarce. Those who can
supply capital at once reap the customary reward of the
seller who is first to market. Many times there are ir-
rational prejudices against investment in certain locali-

23
ties ( distance or some other factor) causing the return on
capital there to be abnormally high. Those who are true
judges of economic values are likely to gain an extra re-
tarn in such areas.
The published percentages of two British
8
trusts show typical geographical distribution.
Industrial & General Trust, Ltd.
March 31, 1926
Great Britain 37.74$
South America( excluding Argentina). • . • 14.77
British Dominions & Dependencies) .... 14.70
Argentina 11.67
United States of America. 8.71
Europe( excluding Great Britain) 4.82
Asia and Africa( exclud ing British
Dominions and Dependencies) 4.64
Mexico and Central America 2 .95
100 .00%
Investment Trust Corporation, Ltd.
May 1, 1928
Great Britain 34.7$
British Dominions and Dependencies. ... 6.8
United States of America 15.9
Cuba 1 .7
Argentina ... ..... .,11.7
Brazil 5.5
Other South American countries. 4.2
Mexico 0.5
Central America • 1.0
Continental Europe 15.2
Other countries • . 2.8
100 .0%
It should also be noted that British diversi-
fication is widespread from the numerical point of view.
Professor Grayson found that the average number of invest-
^Robinson, L. R., Investment Trust Organization and
Management
, p. 273
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merits held by the typical British trust was 425.
(2) Restriction on the concentration of funds *
-- The percentage of the investment fund which can be
placed in any one industry, in any one country or region,
or in any one type of security is usually specified in the
charter of the trust. This is obviously a means of en-
forcing diversification.
From a survey of 149 leading British trusts,
Dr. Leland Rex Robinson presents the following statistics
on charter requirements concerning the amount of the in-
/o
vestment fund that may be placed in any one security:
Compan-
ies •
" 1. No restriction placed on the amount
which may be invested in any one
security • • • • • 67
2. Not more than 5% of the total may be in-
vested in any one security. (14 of the
22 companies except British Government
securities.) 22
3 # Not more than 10% of the total may be in-
vested in any one security. (8 of the
19 companies except British Government
securities.) • 19
4. Not more than 5% of the combined share
and debenture capital or 10% of the sub-
scribed capital--the phrase Hwhichever is
greater"being added in most cases--may
be invested in any one security. (10 of
the 19 companies except British Govern-
ment securities.) 19
5« Miscellaneous 22
Total 149 "
(3) Restriction of the acquisition of in-
terests in a single enterprise. The exact nature of this
Grayson, T. J. op. cit., p. 77-8
Robinson, L. R. op. cit., p. 270
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limitation is also usually stated in the charter. It is
for the purpose of preventing the trust management from
securing control of any concern. The management is thus
prevented from assuming directive or administrative duties
extraneous to the main business of investment management.
(4) Substantial purchases of securities un-
questionably sound and readily marketable . The general
adherence to this policy keeps the trust in the field of
true investment where it belongs. It assures a steady
and certain income at all times, and it keeps the trust
in liquid condition. This last enables the trust to se-
cure immediate cash with which to take advantage of
special investment opportunities.
This tendency to accumulate sizeable amounts
of strong securities is shown by the relatively large
bondholdings of the British trusts. The figures from
eight representative companies showed the following:''
Bonds 54$
Preferred Stock . . 20%
Common Stock. . . . 26%
100%
Internal Policies
The British show a similar conservatism in
matters less directly concerned with the management of
the portfolio.
(1) Borrowed Capital . Practically all
"Grayson, T. J. op, cit., p. 77-e8
u1
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British trusts obtain a good part of their capital through
the public sale of debentures • These obligations usually
carry a low rate of interest. This means that a large
part of the earnings will be available for distribution
of the ordinary ( common) shareholders • The amazingly high
returns paid on the ordinary stock of numerous British
trusts are in no small degree attributable to this policy
of operating with borrowed capital. The reason for the
high investment standing of the British trust debentures
lies in the fact that large stock equities protect these
obligations
•
Most people are familiar with the significance
of equities as affecting the investment value of corporate
obligations. Assume the following balance sheet:
Total Assets $250,000 Debentures $100,000
Common Stock 100,000
Surplus 50 ,000
$250,000 $250,000
It is apparent that the claims of the stock-
holders amount to $>150,000. It is equally obvious that
their interests( their equities )serve as protection to
the bondholders. The assets might shrink to $125,000.
The equities of the owners would be largely swallowed up,
but the bondholders would still be secure. On the other
hand, if assets should increase to $300,000, equities
would rise and the bondholders 1 position would be
I
strengthened. The general investment principle follows:
the larger the equities behind a given corporate obliga-
tion, the higher the investment standing of that obliga-
tion. All this is recognised by British trust management
and a characteristic stipulation of investment trust char
ters is that the issue of debentures shall not exceed the
share capital. Recent figures (January 1, 192 8) for thirty
representative English trusts, and twenty-five Scottish
reveal the general practice.
English Trusts
Debentures 31,121894 44$
Preference Stock 20,138,075 28$
Ordinary Stock 19,903,215 28$
Total 71,163,184 100$
Scottish Trusts
Debentures 22,506,671 49$
preference Stock 11,102,034 31$
Ordinary Stock 9,041,356 20$
Total 45,650,061 100$
Besides this long-term borrowing through
debentures, there is usually some provision for temporary
bank borrowing, but this practice is for the most part
circumscribed. A frequent restriction is limitation of
temporary borrowing to 10$ of the share capital and sur-
plus •
It should be explained in passing that very
small amounts of preferred and ordinary stock are held by
/vWinston, A., op. cit., p. 931-2

the general public. They get the debentures. The orig-
inal organisers hold most of the stock. They first issue
a simple type of share which is later split up into pre-
ferred and ordinary, but still representative of the
original ownership.
(2) Reserves and Dividends . — Among the
British trusts the policy of creating large reserves is
almost universal. Practically all capital gains, gains
realised through the sale of securities at a profit, are
kept in the business (unrealised capital gains are not
counted at all). Such a procedure eventually builds up
the investment fund and ultimately results in big divi-
dends on the ordinary stock, besides increasing the
equities behind the debentures and serving as a general
protection against financial mishap. If the reserve gets
too large, it may be distributed as an extra dividend or
capitalised for the benefit of the shareholders. The
method of paying dividends is an interesting one. Pay-
ments are commonly semi-annual. The first is called the
interim dividend, the other, the final dividend. In the
case of the preferred stock, the dividends are usually of
equal size, but in the case of the ordinary shares, the
interim dividend is moderate while the final one is much
larger.

(3) Economy of Operation * -- The British
trusts keep expenses down. From his analysis of sixty-
three trusts, Grayson reports that "In only eight in-
stances does the expense of management exceed f 10 ,000 a
year, and this covers trustees 1 and directors' salaries,
and compensation for managing secretaries, stenographers,
and clerical assistants." He finds also that these com-
panies show an average ratio of expense to income of
6.44$. Basing his calculations on issued capital,
Robinson finds that for thirty leading London companies
the average ratio of management expense to capital is
0.46$, while for twenty-four leading Scottish companies
it is 0.41$.
Several factors are at work to keep costs
down. Most important is the practice of group management.
Interlocking directorates and joint managers bring about
the centralisation of direction for the portfolios of
many trusts, thus spreading administrative costs over a
large fund. Another element is the low cost of marketing
securities. The securities of most British trusts stand
high in public esteem and new issues are quickly taken
up. Such a condition frequently allows the direct sale
of new securities without the intermediation of profit-
taking bankers. Lastly, long experience has reduced many
'^Grayson, T.J. op. cit., p. 64
'^Grayson, T.J. loc. cit.
^Robinson, L. R. op. cit. p. 405

managerial activities to routine which enables perform-
ance at minimum cost.
Other Income and Other Types
So far, the investment trust has been con-
sidered as an organisation that devotes itself solely to
the investment and reinvestment of a fund in a large
number of securities for the purpose of securing a regular
income from interest and dividends, and at times deriving
a profit from the sale of appreciated securities. Such
an organisation is a "pure" investment trust. But most
companies listed as investment trusts in Great Britain
are not 100 per cent "pure." Frequently, while devoting
most of their energies to legitimate investment activities
many trusts undertake side lines such as the performance
of ordinary trust funct ions(registrar, transfer agent,
trustee )or the participation in underwriting syndicates.
As long as these activities are entered into cautiously
and are not allowed to encroach on the rrain business,
they may prove an easy and welcome source of income. But
if they are engaged in to- extensively, administration of
the portfolio is likely to suffer, and the company becomes
a hybrid, not strictly classifiable as an investment trust
There are also companies in Great Britain
which go even further afield, and, while generally listed
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as investment trusts, ere not entitled to such classifi-
cation from the point of view of investment science.
Usually these companies center their activities in some
special field, and within that field they frequently pur-
chase controlling interests, and may even go to the ex-
treme of owning and operating individual enterprises. For
example, there is the Rubber Plantations Investment Trust,
Ltd. which not only deals generally in the shares of rub-
ber companies, but even operates rubber plantations in
India and tea plantations in Sumatra. Grayson aptly
remarks, "Investment trusts of this type, no matter how
cleverly they may be managed, cannot be considered con-
servative or attractive from a purely investment stand-
point, although from a speculative point of view they may
offer and give greater rewards than those trusts which
restrict their activities to holding and dealing in in-
vestment securities."
Growth and Earnings
The steady growth of the British companies
shows clearly that the investment trust is no mere finan-
cial fad. In 1886 there twelve trusts listed on the
London Stock Exchange; these had an aggregate capital of
£6, 500,000. By 1890 the number in Edinburgh and London
combined was between fifty and sixty. At the beginning
'Grayson, T. J. op. cit., p. 37
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of the World War there were nearly a hundred. Although
the war was a severe testing for the British trusts,
figures for 1927 show 125 investment trusts with a total
paid-in capital of over * 150,000 ,000 • The number of
British trusts listed in Keane's Manual for 1929 was 152,
with a capital of £227,000,000. The latest estimate puts
the number at 170(104 English, 66 Scottish), and the cap-
'f
ital at £ 269,000,000.
Under the present capitalistic order we judge
economic fitness by the test of net profits. By this test
the British trusts make a fine showing. The following
statistics give a general idea of earnings at the present
time, especially do they show the steady recovery made
since the World War. Analysis of the earnings of a number
of the largest trusts of Great Britain(25 English, 23
Scottish)show the following earnings on issued capital:
English Scottish
1922 5.79$ 5.23$
1923 6.33 5.75
1924 6.02 6.30
1925 6.29 6.62
1926 6.42 6.71
1927 6.77 6.75
Average 6.27$ 6.23$
The second table shows the percentage of net
earnings to common stock, and also reveals the fact that
the British trusts still follow their traditional policy
of building up reserves.
^Badger, R. E. Investment
, p. 542
Keane's manual of Investment Trusts, 1929
/yl Keane's Investment Trust Monthly 75 (December, 1929/Winston, A. op. cit., p. 931-2
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British Trusts
per cent earned per cent of earn-
on common ings carried to
surplus
1922 9.25 3.23
1923 10.46 4.40
1924 7*79 3.11
1925 8.46 3.09
1926 8.77 2.79
1927 10.89 3.18
Awpt*b crpri v ci 9 .27 3.30
Scottish Trusts
per cent earned per cent of earn-
on common ings carried to
surplus
1922 7.23 1.88
1923 8.04 2.84
1924 10.09 4.40
1925 11.25 4.53
1926 11.74 4.89
1927 12.88 4.79
Average 10 .20 3.89
The last table shows still more clearly the
remarkable advance that the trusts have made since the
war, and also reveals the well-known fact that the shares
of most British trusts are subject to capital appreciation.
(The present value column is on the basis of a £1,000 in-
vestment in 1913.)
Winston, A. op. cit., p. 931-2

Present 1914 Present
Value Rate Rate
Army & Navy Investment Trust. 1,905 8.5$ 15%
British Investment Trust. • • 1,704 14 .0 21
Generel Investors & Trustees. . 5,535 5.0 16
Guardian Investment Trust • • 2,042 5.5 11
Mercantile Investment &
General Trust • 2,520 6.0 15
Investment Trust Corporation. 1,982 12.25 20
Metropolitan Trust 1,609 12.0 19
U» S. Debenture Corporation • 2,056 10 .0 15
# # #
The general course of British development has
"been indicated. Part III deals with the investment trust
in the United States. It will become apparent that the
British experience has been influential in shaping Ameri-
can policies and practices. The British trust is the
standard, it represents orthodoxy in the field. The
British trust has proved its worth, it affords a basis
for comparison. Innovations in this country must be able
to show superiority over traditional methods before one
is justified in hailing them as genuinely progressive
steps •
r— 1 " 11 " "
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GENERAL
Redeflr.it ion
In Part I the investment trust was rather
loosely defined as "an organisation for the collective
investment of the funds of numerous individuals in numer-
ous securities." A more exact statement is necessary.
The following definition is offered: the investment trust
is an agency by which the combined funds of different in-
vestors are placed in a variety of securities, scientifi-
cally selected by skilled management, for the purpose of
ensuring safety of principal through diversification, of
securing a steady income from interest and dividends, and
of obtaining profit through capital appreciation; but in
no instance assuming a controlling interest or any kind
of managerial responsibility in the enterprises whose
securities are purchased. This definition will prove suf-
ficient for all practical purposes. Any organisation de-
parting very far from the requirements can usually be
classified under another heading, although in the present
Cf. Schreiber, H. E. The Accounts of An Investment
Trust , 47 Journal of Accountancy 161-73, (March, 1929)
;
Also; Robinson, L. R. op. cit., p. 13-4
«<
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chaos of American growth, baffling borderline cases ap-
pear which are simply unclassifiable.
The Terminology Controversy
As pointed out earlier, the term "trust" is
not an especially accurate designation of the type of or-
ganisation under consideration. Fowler puts the situa-
tion clearly* "The modern investment trust in Great
Britain and, for the most part, in the United States
does not contain the element of trusteeship or personal
responsibility • In the majority of cases, there is no
trust relationship between the buying public and the in-
vestment trust. Under strict interpretation, therefore,
the term f investment trust* is a misnomer."
Some people seem to think that the word "trust
should be avoided in all instances where fiduciary rela-
tionship is not actually present. A false impression is
created in the minds of the buying public. The purchaser
of stock in an investment trust organised under general
corporation laws stands in the same relation to the trust
as does the stockholder in any industrial enterprise in-
corporated in a like manner. But the purchaser is likely
to think that the label "investment trust" implies some
peculiar fiduciary relationship between himself and the
organisation, whereby his funds are protected by unusual
: Fowler, J . F. op. cit., p. 2

safeguards . From the strictly logical point of view,
there is much to be said in favor of setting up a new
and precise terminology that will distinguish organisa-
tions embodying a real trustee element from those that do
not. Some of the financial journals have recently at-
tempted to introduce such terms as: investment company,
investment trust company, security investment company.
This writer sees no particular reason for
attempting to produce a brand new terminology. The term
"investment trust" has been established through long
usage. It really means something in the investment world.
Furthermore, the growth of language does not proceed ac-
cording to the laws of formal logic. If the word "trust"
is appropriate, it will survive; if not, some other term
will displace it. For instance, there is no reason, out-
side of an historical one, why big corporations of the
monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic types should be called
"trusts", but the name adheres just the same. At the
present time, the prospectuses of investment trusts usu-
ally explain the legal structure of the enterprise quite
clearly. Persons of common sense soon find out whether
the organisation in which they are interested is a corpo-
ration or something else. Those who will not investigate
this far are hopeless, they will never understand what
11
they are doing in the sphere of investment despite all
precautions taken in their behalf,
Analagous types
It is not to be thought that the benefits of
diversification and the possibilities of expert manage-
ment were unknown in the United States prior to the re-
cent investment trust movement. Wealthy investors have
always spread their holdings widely and employed invest-
ment management to watch their securities and to make
profitable changes.
The securities of certain enterprises also
afford advantages comparable with those afforded by in-
vestment trusts. For instance, the obligations and
shares of the large public utility holding companies give
the purchaser an interest in scores of subsidiary con-
cerns, and an opportunity to participate in the increased
earnings incident to growth, and to enjoy the fruits of
large-scale management. Another example is the bonds of
the Federal Farm Land Banks which rest upon large numbers
of individual farm mortgages. Even the savings bank of-
fers the element of diversification in some degree.
Outline of Growth
The growth in the United States has been re-
cent and rapid. As far b»ck as 1895 we find the Boston
<
39
Personal Property Trust, followed by the Railway and
Light Securities Company of New York in 1904, and the
Alexander Fund of Philadelphia in 1907, Although not
technically known as investment trusts, these early
schemes had. many of the essential characteristics. But
prior to 1924 the development was very small. Robinson
has compiled figures for American and Canadian trusts
down to February, 1929.
Year'
Companies
Formed
Prior to 1924 12
1924 11
1925 11
1926 14
1927 50
1928 61
January 1929 10
Total 169^
The total capital of these 169 enterprises
was slightly over $1,000,000,000.
It is extremely difficult to secure accurate
statistics on such a rapid development. The growth
figures of H. E. Schreiber are inserted for comparison^
Total Invested
Year Number Capital
1923 15 $ 15,000,000
1924 27 75,000,000
1925 48 150,000,000
1926 69 300,000,000
1927 150 700,000,000
1928 (June) 199 1,200,000,000
^Fowler, J. F. op. cit., p. 4
'"^Robinson, L. R. op. cit., p. 548
^10 Canadian
6 Schreiber, H • E. op. cit.
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1929 was the most spectacular year of all*
By July the number of trusts in this country was esti-
mated to be 260, with a combined capital of $1,700,000,000
By the end of the year, the capital was close to $4,000,-
000,000* The number of trusts is unknown, but was proba-
bly in excess of 500*
Foreign Investment
The British development was due in large
measure to the international trade situation. The in-
vestment trust grew up to meet the needs of a country
with a heavy favorable balance of trade and an excess
supply of investment capital. It was at first believed
that the use of the investment trust in the United States
would arise out of a similar situation. IXiring and after
the World War, the United States became a great exporting
nation* Due to the war-stricken condition of European
industry and to the high American tariffs on imports,
goods did not come in to balance the outflow, and the
balance of trade grew heavily in favor of the United
States* In order to bring about the necessary equation,
large amounts of American capital flowed abroad. The in-
crease of American investment in other countries is shown
by the foreign security flotations in the United States
from 192) to 1927.
>
^March, F. 0* Activities of Investment Trusts,
129 Chronicle 865-6, (August 10, 1929)
i
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G(figures in millions)
1920 $ 448.7
1921 605.2
1922 750.0
1925 511.8
1924 1,050.0
1925 1,100.0
1926 1,052.8
1927(11 months) 1,195.5
Under these circumstances it seemed only
natural that the investment trust should be utilised to
facilitate the movement of capital. As a matter of fact,
the Edge law, passed as early as December, 1919, provided
for the Federal incorporation of enterprises to engage in
the foreign acceptance business or to operate along in-
vestment trust lines. These companies were to start with
an initial capital of $2,000,000 and were to be under the
supervision of the Federal Reserve Board. Only a few
were formed. The First Federal Foreign Banking Corpora-
tion is now the only enterprise in operation under this
law. It holds a diversified list of foreign securities
on which collateral trust bonds are issued.
The investment trust movement, however, did
not spread far in this direction. L. K. Speaker advances
two important reasons why this was so:
"(1) The United States still remains in many
respects a new and partially undeveloped country. For
that reason American capital will find favorable oppor-
Badger, R. E. op. cit., p. 695
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tunity for investment at home.
"(2) Since the most of the foreign financing
we are doing is in government and municipal bonds, the
better class of issues, if the interest rate is attrac-
tive, find ready distribution through the direct method
via the exchanges. 1"
Reasons for American Growth
Although the investment trust has not devel-
oped as £ medium for foreign investment, it has had a
tremendous growth in American finance, and the reasons
for this growth must be sought in the domestic area.
A number of more or less interacting causes
seem responsible for the rise of the investment trust.
First of all, this country has had a period of sustained
prosperity. Even admitting the existence of bad spots
such as the agricultural depression and considerable con-
tinuous unemployment, it must be granted that in general
the American people have recently experienced a very
high degree of material well-being, not in the absolute
sense perhaps, but certainly relatively as compared with
the rest of the world both now and in the past. This
increase in the national income has naturally led to
an increase in savings, in capital seeking invest-
^ Speaker, L. M* The Investment Trust, p. 101
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merit. Especially important is the fact that much of this
new capital is in the hands of a great number of new cap-
italists, small capitalists -- professional men, working
men, small entrepreneurs. Individually considered, their
savings are small; in the aggregate, large. Hopeful and
inexperienced, they have come to the security markets for
the first time.
On the other side, the growth of American bus-
iness has resulted in a corresponding growth in the volume
of corporate securities. The financial structure of Amer-
ican corporations has grown exceedingly intricate and com-
plex, and its securities have reflected these conditions.
It is simply impossible for the individual investor to
make his security analysis by himself, he must seek com-
petent advice.
There has been sales pressure from the dis-
tributors of securities. There are fashions in finance,
and the sellers of securities are constantly looking for
some new style to dangle before the public eye. The in-
vestment trust was something new. It provided security
dealers with a novel and persuasive appeal.
The great profits of corporations have also
been a factor. Investors have been eager to get into
common stocks, to share in rising earnings, extra-divi-
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dends, and stock bonuses. Lastly, there has been the
greatest stock-market boom of history (January, 1927 to
October, 1929). The public rushed to purchase in a mar-
ket that seemed destined to keep moving upward forever.
AMERICAN TYPES
General
In Great Britain the structure of the invest-
ment trust is comparatively simple. As pointed out earli-
er, the British trusts are organised as .joint-stock enter-
prises under the Corpanies Acts. They exhibit a sir-pie
capitalisation of debentures, preference stock and ordi-
nary stock. American finance shows no such simplicity.
There is a bewildering diversity of types. This section
does not aim to describe all the variations, but only the
outstanding types, especially those which seem to possess
elements of permanency.
Classification
The major classification will rest on the
relation of the holders of the trust securities to the
portfolios whence they derive their income. This basis
is adopted because it is the simplest, the most precise,
and shows the least overlapping. Other significant
classifications may be made on the basis of the scope of
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management, the legal form, and the field of investment
operation. But sub-classifications on these bases neces-
sitate a great amount of overlapping, they tend to con-
fuse as much as clarify. However, the elements on which
these latter classifications rest are important and will
be discussed in connexion with each type that is taken up
under the classification adopted^
Outl ine
The following are the main headings in the
classification. Under each heading one or more actual
trusts will be described and analysed.
(1) Statutory trusts . — The portfolio is
owned by the trust itself, not directly by the security
holders
•
(2) Contractual trusts . — The portfolio is
owned directly by the security holders.
(a) Fund type . — The portfolio is
represented as a general fund which is owned in common by
the certificate holders.
(b) Unit-share type . -- The port-
folio consists of separate units or groups of securities,
the exact composition of these units being designated in
advance. Certificate holders are entitled to pro rata
shares in whatever units their certificates originate.
*Cf. Schreiber, F. E. op. cit. p. 161-73. Also,
Robinson, L. R. op. cit., p. 31-48; and Thralls, J.
Different Types of Investment Trusts , 128 Chronicle 949-50
(February 16, 1929)
"
I
The Unit-share type
Because of its simplicity, the unit-share
form will be considered first. It is distinctly an Amer-
ican creation. The reasons for its existence seem to have
been a desire to secure the advantages of diversification
and expert selection while avoiding the dangers of mis-
management inherent in plans which allow for continuous
supervision of the investment fund, and to make an appeal
to the investor by showing him in advance exactly what he
is getting and assuring him that the original selection
will not be disturbed. The important divisions of the
unit-share type must be made on the basis of management.
There is the rigid type which excludes management after
the original selection of securities, and the flexible
type which allows for a very limited supervision of the
portfolio.
The Rigid Type
Diversified Trustee Shares, Series C, is an
excellent illustration of the rigid type. The legal
basis is, of course, contractual -- a trust agreement.
There are three parties to the agreement: the Depositor,
the Trustee, and the certificate holders. In this case,
the Depositor is the American Trustee Share Corporation.
It is the business of this company to set up the trust
?See Prospectus distributed by Curtis, Stephenson
& Co., Inc., Boston. (Undated)

portfolio and to sell the participating shares to the
public(the certificate holders). The Trustee is the
Chatham Phenix National Bank and Trust Company, This in-
stitution holds the securities which constitute the port-
folio, issues the participating certificates, and distrib-
ute' the earnings.
The plan of operation is as follows: the
Depositor delivers to the Trustee certain blocks or units
of specified securities. In this case, every unit must
contain five shares of each of the following stocks:
Moody's
10 Rails Rating
Atchison,Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (The). . Aa
Canadian Pacific Railway Company A
Delaware,Lack. & western R.R. Co. (The) • • Aa
Illinois Central Railroad Company ..... A
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company . • Aa
New York Central Railroad Company ..... a
Pennsylvania Railroad Company (The) .... A
Southern pacific Company A
Southern ailway Company. . Baa
Union Pacific Railroad Company A
10 Public Utilities
American Telephone & Telegraph Company. • • Aa
Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation .... Baa
Commonwealth Edison Company A
Consolidated Gas Company of New York. ... A
Consol. Gas, Elec. Lt. & pwr. Co. Bait imore. A
Detroit Edison Company (The) A
North American Company (The) Baa
pacific Gas & Electric Company Baa
United Gas Improvement Company (The). » • • a
Western Union Telegraph Company (The) ... A

Moody '
s
21 Industrials Rating
Air Reduction Company, Inc A
Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation • • • • A
American Can Company Baa
American Car & Foundry Company. • • • . • Baa
Amer. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.. Baa
Borden Company (The) A
Du Font (E.I.) de Nemours & Company, Inc.. A
Eastman Kodak Company (New Jersey). ... A
General Electric Company Aa
Ingersoll-Rand Company A
International Harvester Company A
National Biscuit Company Aa
Otis Elevator Company A
Procter & Gamble Company (The) A
Reynolds ( R.J
.
)Tobacco Company A
Sears, Roebuck & Company Baa
Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation. ... A
United Fruit Company ..... A
United States Steel Corporation A
West inghouse Electric & Mfg. Company. . • A
Woolworth (F. W.) Company A
9 Oils and Mines
American Smelting & Refining Company. • • Baa
Atlantic Refining Company A
Kennecott Copper Corporation Ba
Prairie Pipe Line Company (The) A
Royal Dutch Company (New York Shares) . . A
Standard Oil Company of California. ... A
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) .... Aa
Standard Oil Company of New York .... Aa
Texas Corporation (The). ..... ... A
For each one of these units so deposited,
4,000 participating shares are issued by the Trustee.
Certificates representing various numbers of shares are
then sold to the public. Certificates may be issued in
denominations of 4,000, 1,000, 600, 500, 100, 50, 25, 10,
and 5 shares. The holder of a certificate representing

4,000 shares would have a 100 per cent claim on the secu-
rities composing the underlying unit, and his certificate
would naturally be the only one issued with respect to
that unit. The shares of a unit are usually distributed
among numerous certificate holders. The purchaser of a
1,000-share certificate would thus have a -|-claim upon
the unit, and the purchaser of a 100-share certificate
would have a l/4C -claim. Certificates are transferable
by delivery.
It is to be emphasised that the certificate
holders are the actual owners of the stocks in the unit.
Neither the Depositor nor the Trustee has any ownership
interest. In fact, the certificate holders may exchange
their certificates for the actual stocks held by the
Trustee. The number of certificates necessary to make
the conversion varies from trust to trust. Certificates
aggregating 800 Diversified Trustee Shares, Series C, or
a multiple thereof are necessary to effect the exchange.
There is no limit to the number of units that
the Depositor company may form. As soon as the shares in
one unit have been sold, another identical unit may be
created and the process repeated.
The main source of income to the certificate
holders is the cash dividends paid on the underlying
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stocks. Any stock rights received are sold for cash and
the proceeds likewise distributed. Stock dividends are
kept and added to the unit in multiples of five, left-
over or fractional shares are sold and the cash distrib-
uted as dividends. In case the stock dividends should
represent unlisted stocks, a sale for cash is also made.
At times, the Depositor may offer the certificate holders
the privilege of reinvesting their earnings through the
purchase of additional shares instead of taking the cash
dividends
•
No substitutions may be made in the stock of
a unit, except as a result of extraordinary events af-
fecting the original stock, such as merger or reorganisa-
tion. The element of continuous supervision, so char-
acteristic of the British trusts, is missing. The man-
agement is paid for its selective function at the time
when the certificates are sold. The price of a share is
calculated from day to day by adding together the market
values of the underlying stocks. To this amount is added
commission fees and accumulated dividends, and lastly, a
charge of per cent of the selling price. This charge
includes all compensation to American Trustee Share Cor-
poration, all incidental expenses, and all trustee fees
in perpetuity. As indicated above, certificate holders
may exchange their shares in croDer amounts for the actual
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underlying securities, and the entire agreement under
which the units are formed and the shares issued may be
terminated by either the Depositor or the Trustee at such
time as the shares outstanding may be less than 100,000.
In case this termination takes place within ten years of
the issue of any certificates, the owners of such certif-
icates are returned a proportionate part of the 6-| per
cent charge made at the time of purchase.
We have then, a trust that utilises the prin-
ciple of diversification and repudiates the idea of con-
tinuous supervision. It is interesting to note the at-
titude of the promoting company. "The absence of manage-
ment as applied to the investment list ensures continu-
ance of a balanced investment, prevents any possibility
of speculation, errors of judgment or manipulation, and
makes it feasible to offer these Shares on a more eco-
nomical basis, so far as the investor is concerned, than
JO
is the case among other investment trusts."
Whatever one may think of this, a real at-
tempt at diversification has been made. A consolidated
balance sheet of the fifty companies whose stocks are
deposited against the trust certificates shows clearly
what diversification means to the small investor; alone
he could never attain such investment strength.
'*prospeetus(see above, page 46)
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
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Diversified Trustee Shares, Series C
(Combined Statements of 50 Companies Whose
Stocks Are Deposited Against the Issue Of
These Shares)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(As of December 51, 1928)
Assets
Plant and equipment $17, 549, 879,000
Investments 4,865,450,000
Current assets 5,178,576,000
Special funds and miscellaneous assets 994,114,000
Prepaid expenses and deferred assets • 415,957,000
TOTAL ASSETS $29,001,976,000
Liabilities
COMMON STOCK $ 9,776,505,000
Preferred stock 1,810,256,000
Funded debt 6,475,158,000
Current liabilities 1,401,871,000
Reserves and miscellaneous liabilities 2,901,926,000
SURPLUS 6,656,280,000
TOTAL LIABILITIES $29,001,976,000
The Flexible Type
This device represents an attempt to retain
whatever advantage the rigid type may seem to possess,
yet at the same time to introduce the element of continu-
ous supervision. A good example of this compromise is
Collateral Trustee Shares of the Investment Trust of New
York, Inc. The general organisation of this trust is
substantially the same as that of the rigid form just
considered. Under a twenty-year trust agreement, the In-
vestment Trust of New York purchases, and deposits with
"See Prospectus distributed by New York Shares Corpora
tion, N. Y.
-i
i
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the Chase Rational Bank, stocks of seventy-five leading
corporations, in specific units aggregating 250 shares.
For esch unit so deposited, 1000 Collateral Trustee Shares,
Series A, are issued and sold to the public at a price
representing the proportional market-value of the secu-
rities in that unit plus a 9% management charge which
compensates Investment Trust of New York for its work.
The only other expense to the certificate holders is a
yearly deduction for trustee services, amounting to about
i of 1 per cent of the value of each unit. The certifi-
cate holders receive all income from cash dividends and
from the sale of rights, warrants, and fractional shares
of stock dividends. Holders of 1000 shares may at any
time exchange their shares for the actual stocks composing
the unit. At the end of the twenty-year trust agreement,
all securities will be sold and the proceeds distributed
to the shareholders.
The seventy-five securities in the original
unit constitute the Primary List. But in addition, there
is a Reserve List consisting of twenty-five similar stocks,
in the words of the prospectus, "Should any corporation in
the Standard Investment Unit show an unsatisfactory change
that may result in decreased earnings, then the management
may cause the stock of the corporation to be sold. The
purpose of the Trust is to sell before its weaken^ poal-

54
ticn becomes reflected in the market price. When a stock
is sold, the proceeds are reinvested in one of the stocks
on the Reserve List. Should any stock advance to a price
seemingly beyond its intrinsic worth, that stock may be
sold, and an amount not less than the cost of the stock
a*
sold, must be reinvested in a stock on the list,"
There are two a dditional features. First,
every six months three new stocks may be substituted in
the Reserve List, but notice of the proposed substitution
must be sent to the stockholders, who will have the right
to vote thereon, secondly, should any stock be sold at
a profit, the profit is not distributed in dividends, but
is placed in a surplus account to be reinvested for the
benefit of the certificate holders*
Nothing would be gained by listing the entire
portfolio of Collateral Trustee Shares, but a few typical
stocks from each of the lists will show that an attempt
is made to buy into companies with good records and pros-
pects, to keep the Reserve List on the same investment
level as the Primary List, and to diversify as between
industries
.
Selections from Primary List
Anaconda Copper Mining Co.
Drug Inc.
General Electric Co.
General Foods Corp.
^Prospectus (see above, page 46)
1I
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International Harvester CO.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
Southern California Edison Co.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey.
U. S. Steel Corp.
F. W. Woolworth Co.
Selections from Reserve List
Atchison, Topeka & Santa pe . Ry. Co.
Chrysler Corp.
Detroit Edison Co.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co.
Kennecott Copper Corp.
Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co.
Montgomery Ward & (jo, inc.
U. S. industrial Alcohol Co.
Western Union Telegraph Co.
The establishment of a reserve list, however,
is not the only means of introducing substitution into
the unit-share type. A different scheme is made use of
by Common Stock Trustee Shares, Series A, of United States
Share Corporation. This is a tyr ical unit-share trust
whereby participating shares are issued upon units con-
sisting of not less than one share of comr on stock in
each of a hundred specified companies.
Substitution in the unit can be made if divi-
dends or capital value of a stock are endangered, or if
an opportunity arises to secure a capital profit. In
order to prevent haphazard or reckless substitution, the
following terms must be complied with at all times:
(1) Not more than 3 per cent of the value of
a unit may be in the stock of any one company;
Keane's Manual, p. 530-49
i
(2) No stock shall be acquired for substitu-
tion to which Moody gives a rating lower than B;
(3) The total investment of the unit must
always show: (a) not more than 10 per cent in stock rated
lower than Ba, (b) not more than 50 per cent in stocks
rated lower than Baa, (c) not less than 20 per cent in
stocks with a rating of A or better, and (d) not more than
12 per cent in any one industry except railroads and pub-
lic utilities, where the limit for each is 20 per cent;
(4) No stock shall be acquired for substitu-
tion which has not paid a dividend within six months
prior to the time of purchase, and which is not listed on
the Stock Exchange of New York, Boston or Chicago.
Fund Type
The fund type is similar to the unit-share
type in that the certificate holders have a direct owner-
ship interest in the portfolio. But there are important
differences. The certificates of the unit-share type
represent a claim on a specific block of securities whose
precise nature is defined beforehand. The certificates
of the fund type represent proportional claims upon a
general fund held by a trustee. The fund consists of
cash or securities, or both. The securities in the fund
must conform to investment standards set forth in the
I1
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original trust indenture, but these securities are not
specifically designated as in the case of the unit-share
trust. The factor of continuous management is usually
present in the fund type, the Depositor corporation having
certain defined powers of changing the composition of the
portfolio. This type more nearly approximates the British*
But whereas in the British type, the stockholders own the
company; in the American fund type, the certificate holders
own the fund directly and the management company provides
its services under contract, the actual cash and securi-
ties constituting the fund remaining constantly in the
hands of a trustee.
Investment Managers Company, Trust Fund A,
will serve to illustrate this form of investment trust.
The company itself is a joint-stock association formed
in 1924 under the laws of the State of New York. The
function of the company is to manage investment funds in
behalf of the holders of certificates representing shares
of beneficial interest in such funds. In 1927 Trust Fund
A was created.
For managing the fund, Investment Managers
Company is entitled to a triple compensation:
(1) 1 per cent of the face value of the cer-
tificates at the time of issue, such charge to be paid
bv the certificate purchasers;
/3 Keane f s Manual, p. 269-84

(2) 1/8 of 1 percent quarterly on the actual
value of the investment fund on the last day of each
quarter;
(3) 1 per cent of the actual value of the
certificates at such time as they may be redeemed, ex-
cept when redemption takes place at the option of the
c ompany
•
Each certificate holder is the creator of a
separate revocable trust that is evidenced by his certif-
icate. This certificate also constitutes a contract be-
tween the certificate holder, Investment Managers Company,
and the Trustee, Central Union Trust Company, whereby the
managing company undertakes to supervise the fund. In
this contract are certain important stipulations:
(1) Out of the ret income derived from the
fund, the certificate holder is entitled to regular
quarterly dividends amounting to 5 per cent per annum;
(2) At the end of each year, the certificate
holder is entitled to an additional distribution;
(3) The certificate holder may at any time
redeem his certificate and receive its actual value in
cash or in proportional amounts of the underlying securi-
ties. The manner of payment is at the option of the com-
pany;
•r
(
(4) Certificates are not transferable, but the
right of redemption may be assigned;
(5) Subscriptions to the fund are to be made
in multiples of $1000, the minimum certificate being for
#10,000.
Under the trust agreement, Investment Managers
Company has absolute control and management of the fund,
subject to the following restrictions:
(1) To the extent that the fund is invested
in common stocks, it shall not be distributed among more
than thirty corporations;
(2) Securities purchased must be regularly
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and must have been
traded in during each of the twelve rronths prior to the
date of purchase for the fund;
(3) Not more than 20 per cent of the value of
the outstanding certificates shall be invested within a
single industry;
(4) No investment shall represent more than
10 per cent of the voting stock of any corporation;
(5) No investment shall be made in any cor-
poration if the total outstanding capital stock of that
corporation shall have a market value of less than $20,-
000,000;

(6) No investment shall be made in the securi-
ties of any corporation if the market-value of such secu-
rities as would be purchased be more than 5 per cent of
the value of outstanding trust certificates;
(7) The company may invest any portion of
the fund in tax-exempt securities, obligations of the
United States, and in call loans, provided the latter are
secured by stocks or bonds with a market-value 20 per cent
in excess of the face of the loans.
In the distribution of earnings, it has been
the policy of the company, after paying the regular 5 per
cent charge, to declare an extra distribution equal to
12£ per cent of the income earned in excess of this
charge. The remainder is reinvested and thereby enhances
the value of the certificates. Extra dividends (on the
face value of outstanding certificates )have been paid as
follows:
1925 0.49$
1926 0.57$
1927 0.84#
1928 0.65$;
The calculation of the face value of certifi-
cates is an interesting procedure. The face value of
outstanding certificates represents the market-value of
the assets applicable to those certificates at the time
of purchase or issue. Appreciation in the value of the
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fund tends to make the net value of the certificate in-
creasingly greater than the original face value. In
December 1928, there were outstanding against Fund A,
1,255,461 shares with a total face value( value at time
of issue) of |15,286,700. This represents a face value of
$1217 .61 per 100 shares. But if undistributed income of
$822,777.01 and unrealised profit ( increases in market-
value over cost) of $1, 380, 229 #32 are added to the total
face value, there is a grand total of $17,489,706.33.
This gives a net value of $1,393.09 per 100 shares, and
for a new purchaser, this last amount would be the face
value which he would have to pay for 100 new shares. In
December 1927 the net value per 100 shares was $1,244.53.
A holder of 100 shares at the end of 1927 would thus be
able to sell his shares a year later at a profit of
$158.56.
A condensed income statement will show
sources and also reveal the extent of managerial compen-
sation, as well as the process of taking profits through
certificate redemption.
For the Year 1929
Inc ome:
Interest $ 575,132.60
Dividends 254,710.00
Profit on sales 1,322,482.52 $2,152,325.12
Deduct: Management compensation 82,963 .40
* ' • t 1 Lain,
»0I -to
• rro
(Forward)
Deduct: Regular 5%
dividend $725,430.20
Extra dividend 94,500.00
$2,069,561.72
819,950.20
Add: Undistributed income at
beginning of period
Deduct: Accrued profit paid to
certificate holders on
redemption
Undivided Income
#0ver $700,000 of this amount
reinvested in new shares
$1,249,451.52
862,586.58
$2,112,318.10
1,289,541 .09*
$ 822,777.01
Calculated in terms of percentage of face
value of certificates outstanding, the net income from
Fund A has been as follows:
1925
1926
1927
1928
9.00 %
9.21
12.18
14.26
The Statutory Type
Under this heading come investment trusts
that are formed under State laws of incorporation or as
Massachusetts trusts. The statutory type is by far the
most important one in American investment trust finance.
In his study of February, 1929, Robinson found that out
of 156 American investment trusts, 136 were of the stat-
utory type. Within the statutory type, the corporate
Robinson, L. R., op. cit., p. 546-8
#
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form completely overshadows the Massachusetts trusts.
These latter can be disposed of briefly.
Massachusetts Trusts
These associations are found practically only
in the State of Massachusetts. They arose from the fact
that corporations in that state could not hold real es»
tate for investment purposes. In order to get around the
law, title to real estate was vested in a group of trus-
tees, whose powers in respect to the administration of
the property were defined in the trust agreement. The
trustees issued certificates of beneficial interest in
the trust property. These certificates were sold to the
public. These certificates carried limited liability and
were transferable. They are bought and sold in the same
manner as corporate stocks. But the shares have no voice
in the management, otherwise the association would become
a partnership. Recent statutes in Massachusetts have
placed these trusts in practically the same legal posi-
tion as ordinary corporations.
However, a number of investment trusts formed
in Massachusetts have found this device useful. Some of
these trusts issue only a single kind of share, others
exhibit a capitalisation similar to that of a corporation.
Massachusetts Investors Trust is an example
See Dewing A. S. op. cit., p. 13-6
J See Prospectus distributed by Slayt on-Learoyd, Inc.,
Boston.

64
of a trust issuing but one class of shares. The manage-
ment is entrusted entirely to four trustees who receive
6 per cent of the annual income, out of which all ordi-
nary expenses of operation are met. No salaries are paid.
The rest of the income goes to the shareholders. Differ-
ing from the contractual types, the shareholders cannot
demand a direct redemption of their shares in cash or in
securities. They may either sell their shares in the
open-market, or, if a satisfactory price cannot be ob-
tained, the trust must purchase the shares at a price
equal to their net asset value less 1 per cent. This
particular trust surrounds the trustees with no restric-
tions; they have complete freedom in the management of
the portfolio.
Century Shares Trust, sponsored by Brown
Brothers and Company, is organised in practically the
same way. The chief point of difference is in the capital-
isation. There are two types of shares, equal in number,
the Participating and the Ordinary. Brown Brothers pur-
chases these shares from the trustees in units of two
(one Participating, one Ordinary)at a price determined by
the liquidaticn value of outstanding shares. Brown
Brothers retains the Ordinary shares, the Participating
shares go to the public. Each Participating share is
^See prospectus distributed by Brown Brothers & Co.,
Boston.

entitled to a yearly non-cumulative dividend of $2, and
$50 in case of liquidation. Any additional distributions
of earnings or assets are divided 85 per cent to the Par-
ticipating shares and 15 per cent to the Ordinary, In
this trust no management fee is paid to the trustees,
and the portfolio is restricted to insurance and bank
stocks
•
Corporations
Last of all will be considered the invest-
ment trust organised as an ordinary domestic corporation.
This type most clearly approximates the British form, and
is by far the most important type in the United States,
both numerically and in total amount of invested capital,
/r
investors Equity Company is typical. This company was
incorporated in Delaware in May, 1927, its chief char-
acteristics are lack of restraint upon management, com-
plicated capitalisation, and world-wide portfolio diver-
sified between bonds and stocks. The charter and by-laws
contain nothing relating to investment policies and
standards, all responsibility lies with the management.
The plan of capitalisation is somewhat complex, but will
be considered in all its detail, as it illustrates a char
acteristic of incorporated investment trusts in this
country, . The capital set-up is as follows:
Keane's Manual, p. 296,307
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Authorised Outstanding
No Par Common 620,000 252,920
No Par Preferred( cum.) 120,000 30,000A, $6
31,000B, 5.50
Debentures, b% $20,000,000 $5,000,000A, 1947
4,650,000B, 1948
preferred A carries $6 cumulative dividends,
is preferred as to assets at $110 per share, and may be
redeemed, in whole or in part, at $110 on sixty-day no-
tice. Every share of Preferred A carries a non-detachable
warrant which entitles the holder to receive, without cost,
one share of common stock upon the initial payment of a
dividend upon the common. Preferred A may also be ex-
changed for common on the basis of three shares of common
for one of Preferred A plus the attached warrant.
preferred B is a similar stock. The rate per
annum is $5.50. This stock is cumulative, is entitled
to $105 a share in case of liquidation, and is redeemable
at $105. Each share of Preferred B carries a warrant
entitling the holder to subscribe for one share of com-
mon stock at $30 per share up to April 1931, at $40 from
1931 to 1934, and at $50 from 1934 to 1938. Three shares
of common will be exchanged for one share of Preferred B>
plus warrant, plus a cash payment of $30; or two shares
of common for one share of Preferred B, subsequent to the
exercise of the warrant.
Debenture 5's, Series A of 1947, are callable

in whole or In part, on notice of thirty days, at 103 up
to June 1930, thereafter at 100. As long as any deben-
tures are outstanding, the company agrees not to contract
any funded debt unless the net assets of the company are
at least 140 per cent of such debt. If at any time the
net assets fall below 110 per cent of the funded debt, the
company will redeem all outstanding debentures on the
next semi-annual interest date. Debentures A carry non-
detachable warrants entitling the holders to secure,
without cost, five shares of common stock at the time of
the payment of the first dividend on the common stock.
Series B is identical with Series A, except
that the attached warrant entitles the holder to sub-
scribe for five shares of common stock at $30 per share,
such warrant being exercisable up to date of maturity or
prior redemption.
Although no special restrictions bind the
management, Investors Equity Company has followed the
general policy of investing throughout the world, and in
both stocks and bonds. Such policy is consonant with the
British tradition. In November, 1928, the portfolio con-
tained the securities of 264 companies or political en-
tities. The detail is as follows!
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Domestic Common Stocks 34
Domestic Preferred Stocks 91
Domestic Bonds 41
Domestic Short Term Obligations. ... 3
Foreign Stocks 13
Foreign Dollar Bonds 82
Total 264
The American holdings are quite similar to
those found in the unit-share portfolios shown above. A
few selections from the foreign list will show the general
nature of commitments abroad.
Stocks
1,000 Investment Trust Associates, Ltd., Ordinary
200 Swiss American Electric Co., $6 Preferred
RM 48,000 Deutsch Bank Capital Stock
GM 85,000 German Railways, 1% Preferred
Bonds
% 25,000 Government of Argentina, 6's of 1961
50,000 City of Vienna, 6's of 1952
100,000 Kingdom of Belgium, 7's of 1956
50,000 Republic of Finland, 6i f s of 1956
100,000 Paris Lyons Mediterranean R. R. Co. 6's of 1958
25,000 City of Berlin, 6|'s of 1950
50,000 North German Lloyd, 6*s of 1947
50,000 Kingdom of Italy, 7 f s of 1952
25,000 Nippon Electric Power Co., Ltd., 6's of 1953
50,000 City of Tokio, 5i's of 1961
50,000 Norwegian Hydro-Electric Nitrogen Corp.,
5|Ts of 1957
Another incorporated trust that follows the
policy of international diversification is British Type
tm
Investors, Inc. This company offers an unusually complete
analysis of its portfolio, and their statistics of Sep-
tember 30, 1929 are offered as an example of thorough-
Analysis distributed by Glover & Co., Boston.

going diversification on an international basis •
United States
Banks 6.07 %
Chain Stores. • • 1.11
Chemicals 2.78
Equipment 96
Foods 2.92
Industrial and Manufacturing. • • 9.00
Insurance • • • • • 8.15
Investment Trusts 4.69
Miscellaneous 4.82
Motors 47
Non Ferrous Metals 4.41
Oil 6.03
Public Utilities 2.18
Railroads 7.34
Rubber. .09
Sugar .46
Textiles 09
Tobacco 1 .37
Total United States 62.94 %
Asia
Japan 1.84 %
Total Asia 1.84 %
Australia 30 % ,Z0%
Europe
Austria 1.45 %
Belgium 28
Bulgaria „43
Czechoslovakia 14
Denmark 53
Esthonia 10
Finland 2.69
France 12
Germany 7.95
Hungary 1.02
Italy 3.75
Norway 29
Poland 14
Roumania 11
Russia .22
Serbia .38
Total Europe 19.63 %

Latin America
Argentina 1.84 %
Bolivia 16
Brazil 5,69
Chile 3.92
Colombia 1.19
Costa Rica 50
Cuba .07
Dominican Republic 06
Ecuador 01
Peru 1.62
Uruguay . .23
Total Latin America 15.29$
Total Portfolio 100.00$
The complete freedom of management found in
Investors Equity Company is not entirely characteristic
of American practice. It is quite usual to find certain
limitations upon management explicitly stated in charters
and by-laws. The investment restrictions which govern
the policies of Investment Company of America are worth
quoting in full. They offer an excellent example of the
degree to which restrictions in this country are some-
times pushed in the attempt to check reckless management
beforehand.
No investment shall be made in:
" (1) Real estate.
(2) Any security involving promotion or busi-
ness management on the part of the trust.
(3) Any security involving the risk attend-
ant upon a new and unproved enterprise.
(4) The securities of any company or govern-
v
°Keane's Manual, p. 709-15

ment authority about which reliable information is not
available as respect history, management, assets and in-
come •
(5) Securities which have not been passed
upon by the Advisory Board and placed by the Board on the
•Eligible List. 1
(6) Shares of the Trust except Preferred
Shares for retirement and cancellation.
(7) Any security which subjects the Trust to
unlimited liability.
Concerning diversification:
(1) Not more than 5$ may be invested in the
securities of any one corporation,
(2) Not more than 40$ may be invested in
railroads and steamship lines.
(3) Not more than 40$ may be invested in
public utilities.
(4) Not more than 40$ may be invested in
stocks of banks, trust companies and insurance companies.
(5) Not more than 20$ may be invested in
any other line of industry.
(6) Not more than 40$ may be invested in
the British Empire.
(7) Not more than 10$ may be invested in
any subdivision of the British Empire other than the
British Isles or the Dominion of Canada.
(8) Not more than 20$ may be invested in
any foreign country other than the British Empire.
(9) Not more than one-half of the percentage
permitted to be invested in any foreign country may be
invested in any securities other than securities issued
by the government or a political subdivision t hereof •»
This is a somewhat extreme attempt to en-
7d rr-
msorf o!)
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force a balanced diversification. The usual run of re-
strictions are not quite so stringent.
All the corporate investment trusts so far
mentioned have attempted to secure a world-wide diversifi-
cation, but there are many that do not. A large number
of the American Trusts confine themselves to the domestic
field and many specialise in the securities of a single
industry. Some deal in bonds, excluding stocks, and vice
versa. The names of a few companies speak for themselves:
Airstocks, Inc.; Bond Investment Trust of America; Chain
Store Stocks, Inc.; Electric Investors, Inc; Oilstocks,
Ltd.; Public Utility Investing Corporation; Insuranshares
Corporation.
The Trading Company
It was pointed out at the very beginning,
that investment must be distinguished from speculation,
and that the title of investment trust properly belongs
to those organisations engaged in the former activity.
Along with the genuine investment trust, there has grown
up a device known as the trading company. It is purely
a speculative scheme. The participators toss their
money into a blind pool, and the operators of the pool
attempt to make a speculative profit. The operators have
complete control of the fund. They make no financial
reoorts and publish no list of holdings. The participants

are ignorant of all proceedings; they sirrply sit still
and wait for their quarterly checks. The trading company
is not to be condemned as such. For the person who must
speculate, the trading company affords opportunities for
greater success than he would be likely to achieve by his
own efforts. But there is a danger that such speculative
enterprises may be confused with investment trusts. The
person who wants to secure the advantages of sound in-
vestment management should make sure that he gets them,
and the person who places his money in a trading company
should not fool himself into thinking that he is enjoying
the benefits that a genuine investment trust offers.
INVESTMENT TRUST INTEGRATION
It might be inferred, from what has gone be-
fore, that each individual trust had its own separate
and independent management, that each trust made its own
security analyses and relied on the judgment of its own
executives. This is decidedly not the case. Although
there are a considerable number of trusts having no af-
filiation with other organisations, a great many more
secure part or all of their investment management from
other companies especially equipped for the task of In-
vestment analysis and counsel. The relationships between

the individual trusts and the management companies are
very close and exceedingly complex* Usually the company
which supplies the investment technique has a large common
stock interest, frequently a controlling one, in the com-
panies to which it furnishes service. The management
company thus performs the dual function of investment
specialist and holding company. In addition, it is quite
likely that the holding and managing company has a diver-
sified portfolio of its own, exclusive of its holdings in
subsidiary or affiliated companies.
There are a number of factors which are con-
ducive to the development of investment trust groups cen-
tering around some single management company:"
(1) A trust sponsored by a strong management
organisation is usually better able to raise capital than
a trust which enters the field alone.
(2) It is essential that the management or-
ganisation of a new trust begin to function immediately.
The trust that is affiliated with sn already existing
group enjoys experienced management from the start.
(5) Economy in management costs is an im-
portant factor in trust earnings. Good investment or-
ganisations are costly and will be profitable only when
their activities are applied to a very large investment
T Cf. Robinson, L. R. op. cit., 467-8
(
fund. In a general way, investment management obeys the
law of decreasing costs. The investment of a large fund
can be attended to at a cost not very much greater than
would be required to administer a very much smaller port-
folio. A trust that is linked with a large investment
organisation gets a large part of its investment service
at nominal cost.
American Founders Corporation
A simple exposition of concentration and in-
terlocking in the investment trust field is impossible.
The only feasible procedure is to analyse some special
group. The one selected is known as the American Founders
Group. It is the largest and most important in this
country. It is a pioneer organisation, and one of the
most successful.
As a recent prospectus states, ttAmerican
Founders Corporation was organised under the laws of Mary-
land in 1928 as successor to American Founders Trust, a
voluntary trust organised under the laws of Massachusetts
in January, 1922."
There are four major divisions to the activi-
ties of this company:
(1) A holding company . -- American Founders
Corporation holds the controlling interest in Interna-
vVprospectus by Investment Trust Securities Corp.,
Boston. General information regarding this company in
Keane's Manual, p. 1-42; and Robinson, L.R. op. cit.,
p. 466-83
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tional Securities Corporation of America, Second Inter-
national Securities Corporation, United States & British
International Company, Ltd., and American & General Secur-
ities Corporation. These four companies are regular in-
vestment trusts of the general management type, offering
their debentures and part of their stock to the public.
The controlling interest is also held in Founders General
Corporation, a company which specialises in the distribu-
tion of investment trust securities; and in American
Founders Office Building, Inc., the home office of the
parent corporation and a real estate venture.
The extent of control in these subsidiaries
V3
is revealed by the following figures:'
(a) Preferred stock of:
International Securities Corporation 68.27 %
Second International Securities Corp.
First Preferred 80.53
Second Preferred 100.00
United States & British International 75.78
American & General Securities Corp. 91.67
Founders General Corporation 100.00
(b) Class A Comnon stock of:
International Securities Corporation 83.82 %
Second International Securities Corp. 86.16
United States & British International 89.93
American & General Securities Corp. 80.80
Founders General Corporation 100.00
r3Annual Statement for 1929 130 Chronicle 639-48,
January 25, 1930.

(c) Class B Common stock of:
International Securities Corporation 80.06 %
Second International Securities Corp* 83.33
United States & British International 68.73
American & General Securities Corp. 80.10
Founders General Corporation 100.00
(d) Common stock of:
American Founders Office Building 100.00 %
(2) An investment service company . — The
portfolios of the four subsidiary companies are under the
supervision of the executives of these companies, but the
executives rely on the analyses and advice of American
Founders in making their selections. For this service
the parent company receives a regular fee. International
Securities pays an annual fee of 4 per cent of gross earn-
ings after taxes. The other three trusts pay an annual
charge of \ of 1 per cent of their average resources.
In addition, American Founders supplies investment ser-
vice to the United National Corporation of Seattle which
is the central organisation for a number of Pacific Coast
investment trusts. United National pays American Founders
33 1/3 per cent of the service fees which the former re-
ceives from its affiliated companies.
(3) An investment trust . Besides its
holdings in the subsidiaries, American Founders has a
general portfolio of its own, diversified in over 300
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securities, representing productive enterprises through-
out the world.
(4) A financing company . Through its sub-
sidiary, Founders General Corporation, the parent coirpany
is prepared to engage in the underwriting and general dis-
tribution of the securities of other investment trusts.
Thus it is seen that American Founders Cor-
poration has four sources of income: (1) from the stock
holdings in subsidiaries, (2) from its own portfolio,
(3) from its investment service fees, and (4) from its
financing operations.
United Founders
Before examining the activities of American
Founders in more detail, another organisation, United
Founders Corporation, will be described. This company
stands in a peculiar relation to American Founders, and
an outline of its functions is necessary for a complete
picture of the group.
United Founders Corporation was organised in
February, 1929. In the words of President L.H. Seagrave
(also president of American Founders), this company has
three major purposes:
(1) To take a larger position in certain
important investments than is consistent with
the policies of investment companies of the gen-
========================================
y Annual statement, 1929, op. cit.
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eral management type,
(2) To acquire minority or controlling
interests in investment companies, with the
collateral advantage of bringing investment
service contracts to American Founders Corpora-
tion, and
(3) To acquire a substantial minority
control in the common stock of American Pounders
Corporation so as to insure continuity of manage-
ment •
In the first place, then, United Pounders
plans to make large commitments to single enterprises
and industries. These holdings are regarded as permanent
and are largely confined to the fields of banking, in-
surance, public utilities, and railroads. A few examples
will show the general nature of these investments. Ap-
proximately a 25 per cent interest is held in United
States Electric Power Corporation, one of the largest
public utility holding companies in the United States.
Large blocks of stock are held in Public Utility Holding
Corporation of America and in United National Corporation.
The latter company has controlling interests in invest-
ment trusts, investment banks, real estate enterprises,
and insurance companies in the Pacific Northwest. This
corporation gets investment service for the management of
its trusts from American Pounders Corporation.
In the second place, United Founders aims to
purchase interests in various investment trusts. At
i!
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present such holdings are not so large as in the other
types of enterprises just mentioned above. The largest
interest is in Investment Trust of America, a Massachu-
setts company. In obtaining sizeable holdings in invest-
ment trusts, United Founders seeks not only to secure
dividends and diversify its investments, but, as President
Seagrave stated, to bring contracts for investment ser-
vice to American Blunders Corporation.
Lastly, United Founders is linked with
American Founders by virtue of a one-fourth ownership in
the latter.
Figures showing the distribution of invest-
ments in the portfolio of United Founders will give per-
haps the best idea of the nature of its activities •(Per-
centage figures refer to total assets.)
American Founders Corporation. • • 42.674 %
Transportation 3.036
Public Utilities 24.349
Industrials 4.967
Banks 1.594
Investment Organisations 16.635
Financing Companies .176
93.431
Cash 6.569
100.000 %
Sources and size of income for the year 1929
are as follows:
Interest & Dividends $ 8,145,847
Profits on Sales 7,406,092
Miscellaneous 31,250
Annual Staterent, 1929, op. cit.
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A rough diagram will serve to bring out the
more important interrelations of the entire group.
(Solid lines show ownership or security holdings, dotted
lines show connexion through investment service.)
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Administration
This section describes some details in the
actual operation of the American Founders group proper,
i.e. American Founders Corporation and the four subsidi-

ary investment trusts.
The general investment policies which motivate
the administration of the companies may be stated as fol-
lows:
(1) Wide diversification. — This means
diversification that is international, inter- industrial
,
and among bonds as well as stocks. Besides adhering to
the general theory of spreading the risk, this policy
recognises that opportunities for investment profit are
world-wide. "If stocks in New York are so high that they
cry to be sold at a profit, some company in Germany or
Japan is down and eager for an investor. There always are
bargains if you know where to find them." The same
reasoning applies to individual industries within a given
country. Utilities may be booming while manufacturing
concerns are in the doldrums. The placing of part of
the funds in bonds is based on the idea that for an or-
ganisation interested primarily in investment it is a
good idea to have a considerable part of the fund in
securities that will yield a steady and certain income.
This is especially desirable where the investment trust
has issued its own debentures and preferred stock. With
the fixed charges which these obligations incur, no
chances of default should be taken. American Founders
*S*arton, F« B. Inside An Investment Business ,
The Burroughs Clearing House, (May, 1929)

also recognises the cyclical factor, n at times of low in-
terest rates bonds and other fixed income-bearing securi-
ties are definitely strong in market price."
(3) Maintenance of strong cash position * --
The investment markets are extremely sensitive, high rates
in various parts of the world quickly attract funds, and
security prices are brought back into equilibrium. In
order to take immediate advantage of low security prices
whenever and wherever they may appear, it is obviously
wise to have a sufficiency of fluid funds.
(4) Active supervision of the portfolio . --
While American Found' rs emphatically is not a trading
company handling funds in the manner of the individual
speculator, it does pursue the policy of selling from
time to time in order to take advantage of investment bar-
gains and to avoid deterioration in certain securities.
When the management purchases a security it does so be-
cause that security has true investment value. The securi-
ties purchased are those of indubitably strong companies
with good prospects for the future. But such purcra se by
no means implies permanent retention in the portfolio.
The management does not hesitate to sell for reasons Just
mentioned. This is not speculation, it is merely finan-
cial prudence.
vJSeagrave, L. H. Remarks at stockholders meeting of
American Founders, November 12, 1929
•<
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A few figures from the consolidated earnings
statements as of November 30, 1929 will throw more light
on the subject than many pages of explanation. The major
items of income show the great size of the organisation
and reveal the tremendous importance of profits in invest-
y $
ment trust earnings.
Interest and dividends $ 13,919,790
Profit on sales 17,609,949
Service fees 83,290
Syndicate & other income • • • • 122,199
$ 31,745,228
The chief asset figures from the balance
sheets show the strong cash position and give some idea
of the relative prominence of the different subsidiaries.
Cash and call loans $ 10,996,515
General portfolio 36,518,050
International Securities. . . . 33,728,697
Second -international. ..... 14,300,791
U.S. & British International. . 9,480,882
American & General. ...... 14,685,882
Founders General 7,575,000
American Founders Building. . • , 251,471
|127,537,288
Since 1921 the average rate of gross earnings
of all five companies has been in excess of 12 per cent
on the average capital funds. This excellent showing
must be attributed to efficient management which has not
only been able to make large profits, but has shown a
constantly declining ratio of costs to income.
American Founders and each of its subsidiaries
^From Annual Statement, 1929, on. cit.
^Ibid.
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are under some restrictions as to management. These re-
strictions are contained in the indentures under which
the debentures of the companies are is sued . In order to
sell these obligations at a low rate it is necessary that
they be accorded all reasonable protection. The invest-
ment covenants of International Securities Corporation is
represent ytive of the entire group. The items are as
jo
follows:
"(1) The Corporation shall not invest its
funds in securities of any corporation or organisation
unless such corporation or organisation or its predecessor
or the guarantor of any guaranteed securities, shall have
been established for at least four years prior to such
investment
•
(2) Not more than 5&% of the corporation's
funds shall be invested at any one time in securities
originating .... in Great Britain and not more than
Z5% shall be invested at any one time in securities orig-
inating in any other one nation or country except the
United States of America.
(5) Not more than 10% of the Corporation's
funds shall be invested in securities representing any
one distinct class of business or industry.
(4) Not more than lf$ of the Corporation's
funds shall be invested in securities of any one obligor
or issuer except governmental obligations and not more
than 5% thereof shall be invested in the securities of
any one government except either the United States of
America or Great Britain.
(5) The Corporation's funds shall be invested
in at least 400 different securities.
(6) The Corporation shall not engage in any
promotion, business management or business financing and
will confine its operations to the investment and re-
investment of its resources in marketable securities
.
Robinson, L. R. op. cit., p. 177-8

The technique of investment is interesting.
The investment organisation is concentrated at the home
office in New York. This organisation is made up of
three groups: (1) the economists, (2) the analysts, and
(5) the investment executives . The economists attempt to
locate profitable investment areas in all parts of the
world through the study of basic conditions in trade, in-
dustry, and finance. The analysts are split into two
groups: the single- industry men who specialise in sepa-
rate fields such as banks, utilities, industrials, and
rails; and a second group that concentrates on the securi-
ties of separate countries. These men are drawn from the
countries concerned, and there are representatives in
London and Berlin. Through the joint efforts of the
economists and the analysts, recommendations for purchase
and sale are made which go to the investment executives,
final decision resting with the Investment Committee.
Upon approval by this committee recommendations are sent
to the executive committee of American Founders and to
the executive committees of the associated companies.
It is entirely up to those committees as to the action
that will be taken on the recommendations. If approvals
are given for purchase or sale, the investment department
of American Founders is notified and this department ex-

ecutes the order in the market* The executive committee
of American Founders makes its own independent decisions
regarding its own portfolio.
A few more statistics will complete this
study of the American Pounders group. The following table
shows the international distribution that has been at-
s3/
tained:
United States 42.375 %
British Commonwealth of Nations • • • • 8.694
Central and South America • • 3.395
Continental Europe:
Northern Europe 2.588
Central Europe 25.570
Eastern Europe 2.060
Southern Europe 2.787
Western Europe 1.191 . . 34.196
Japan and Asiatic Countries 2.564
91.222
Cash 8.778
100, %
The next table shows the division among stocks
or
and bonds; and among types of enterprise.
Bonds
Government 14.765 $
Transportation .441
Public Utilities 4.595
Industrials 5.543
Mortgage and other Bonds 5.788
Investment Organisations .142
Financial Companies. .... .828
32 .092 %
Annual Statement, 1929, op. cit.
J?Ibid.

Preferred Stocks
Transportation 449 %
public utilities 692
Industrials 585
Investment Organisations 3.139
Financial Companies ... .874
5.739 %
Common Stocks
Transportation 3.434
Public Utilities 15.786
Industrials 16.076
Banks and Insurance Companies .... 7.990
Investment Organisations 11.287
Finance Companies .......... .816
53.391 %
Cash 8*728
100. %
It is a well established principle of invest-
ment that in as many cases as possible foreign securities
should be payable in American gold dollars. This is es-
pecially desirable when the countries in which the securi-
ties originate have an unsatisfactory record from the
standpoint of monetary stability. In instances where it
is impossible to secure payment in American gold dollars,
effort should be made to have the securities payable in
the currence of some foreign country whose monetary
structure is unquestioned. The following figures show
the chief currencies in which principal and dividends of
American Founders' holdings are payable:
U. S« Dollars 67.694 %
Pounds Sterling .... 7.054
Reichmarks 13.959
Annual Statement, 1929, op. cit.
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Japanese Yen 1.108 %
Austrian Schillings. . . • 1.675
Colombian Pesos 1.342
Hungarian Pengos 1.574
Dutch Guilders 997
Swedish Kronen .216
Norwegian Kronen .583
Italian Lires 083
French Francs .863
Belgian Francs .150
Polish Zloties 256
Other Currencies 2 .446
100. %
It was suggested above that, with an in-
crease in the fund which an investment organisation
handles, there is usually a lowering of proportionate
costs of management. The American Founders group has
grown rapidly in the past three years, and the ratios of
expenses to income have been as follows:
1927 17.20$
1928 15.90$
1929 9.05$
The preceeding discussion shows clearly that
investment trusts in United States have attained size
and strength, and that management technique has been
developed to a point where sizeable investment profits
can be secured without departure from sound principles.
Annual Statement, 1929, op. cit.
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MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS
American investment trusts are still in the
formative period. The preceding analyses give some in-
dication of the diversity of practices and policies now
prevailing. But a few general trends may be discerned,
and there are a number of characteristics which stand out
in contrast with the British tradition.
The General Trend
Although for a while the contractual forms
with little or no supervision were predominant ( and they
are still important), the trusts of the statutory type,
largely corporate in form, conferring broad powers to
management and attaining a fairly widespread diversifica-
tion, have overshadowed the former. The contractual
types experienced quite a growth in 1927 - 28, but in
the next two years the statutory types gained rapidly.
These last now constitute over 80 per cent of the trusts
formed in this country.
Specific Characteristics
( 1 ) Establishment and control of trusts by
banks and investment banking houses . The organisation
«
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of investment trusts opened up new possibilities for
profit to these institutions and they were not slow to
take advantage. Investment trusts with the backing of
powerful established houses made an immediate appeal to
the public who have great faith in the soundness and in-
tegrity of these institutions. It has been estimated that
60 per cent of the investment trusts in this country are
sponsored or controlled by banks or bankers. There is,
however, an element of danger in this procedure. It is
possible that some investment trusts may be too closely
linked with parent investment houses and come to serve
as a dumping ground for indigestible securities or that
large blocks of issues underwritten or distributed by
the parent houses may clog the portfolios to the detri-
ment of diversification.
(2 ) Growth of large investment trust groups
or "families" through the holding company device and in-
terlocking directorates . The American Founders group
previously discussed is a typical example; other groups
center around banking institutions, such as the group
affiliated with State Street Investors Corporation.
(3 ) Concentration of Investment in the
American field. It is only natural for an investment
trust organised in a particular country to place the bulk
Fowler, J. F. op. cit., p. 25

of its funds in domestic securities. The management is
more familiar with the domestic enterprises. There is
greater certainty of making sound investments and securing
profits at home than in unfamiliar foreign fields. Fur-
thermore, to go heavily into foreign securities necessi-
tates a large and expensive staff of experts. Even the
British trusts which make international diversification
a cardinal principle, place the bulk of their funds in
securities within the British Empire. A recent analysis
of 19 British trusts showed 42 per cent of their port-
folios so placed. American trusts are likely to show a
greater percentage in respect to securities originating
in this country. There are reasons for the American
practice. In the first place, it takes some time to
build up a foreign department, and in the second place,
the best and most numerous investment opportunities have
recently been here in the United States. Some trusts
even limit their portfolios to this country. This is un-
wise. The economic world still has the cyclical habit,
and there will surely be times when American trusts will
be glad to buy and sell on the foreign bourses.
(4 ) Concentration of investments within a
restricted industrial area . Trusts have sprung up
which not only confine operations to the domestic field,
Robinson, L. R. op. cit., p. 281

but which specialise in the securities of one or two in-
dustries within that field. As mentioned above, there
are trusts which specialise in utilities, oils, banks,
and aviation. The argument advanced in favor of these
trusts is that more careful selection can be made through
specialisation, that spreading out over too wide an area
will lead to unintelligent and haphazard selection. There
is some point to this argument, but no matter how skilled
the management may be within its narrow field, the
strength of the trust is impaired by the limited diversi-
fication of its portfolio. And there are likely to come
times when even the best management will find opportuni-
ties scarce in its selected field, and the trust would
gain much more by commitments elsewhere.
(5) Predominance of comr-on stocks in the
portfolio * -- There are two reasons for this, first, the
great corporate earnings of the past few years have been
reflected in rising stock prices and increased dividends;
and second, the general a cceptance of the theory that
well-selected common stocks make a better long-run invest-
ment than bonds. The essence of this theory is that stock
values and returns tend to increase with the economic
growth of the country, and that common stock earnings keep
pace with rising price levels, thus preventing decline in
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the purchasing power of the investor's income. This
theory is sound when properly interpreted, but it does
not imply that overvalued stocks are good investments or
that stocks are always better investments than bonds.
The American public recently went crazy on common stocks
and has not yet recovered.
(6) Emphasis on profit-taking through sale
of securities . -- When the British trusts sell a security
at a profit it is usual to retain the entire proceeds in
the trust. The profits enlarge the fund as a whole and
eventually the stockholders receive increased dividends
through the enlargement of their equities. If the surplus
built up in this manner becomes too large the excess may
be distributed in cash or as a stock dividend.
The American trusts have not been so conserva-
tive. They have emphasised profit-taking much more than
have the British trusts, and they tend to distribute a
large part of their earnings immediately. The earnings
of 15 trusts in 1928 showed that profits from sale of
securities amounted to 57 per cent of earnings/' Some
trusts have been able to distribute a large share of such
profits and build up sizeable reserves at the same time.
This condition has been due to the rising stock markets
of the past few years. Profit-taking opportunities have
'118 Bankers Magazine 547-51, (April, 1929)

been numerous, and actual profits enormous. Other trusts
have done little in the way of building up reserves, most
of the profit has been paid out. This practice has fre-
quently been due to the fact that in some trusts the
management derives its compensation from stock ownership,
and in many such cases the managers and promoters have
gathered in all that they could.
This writer does not believe that recent op-
portunities for profitable sale of securities will con-
tinue on such a scale. The trusts will have to give more
attention to straight investment return and less to buy-
ing and selling. Those trusts which have paid out all of
their profits will have to mend their ways, and the others
will find it necessary to put an increasing percentage of
their profits into reserves and pay a smaller proportion
in dividends.
(7) Complexity of capital structure . -- This
has been mentioned before. American corporate trusts
are likely to show several classes of debentures, common
stocks and preferred shares. Preferred and common stocks
are frequently sold in units. Convertible features,
rights, and warrants are common. All this is incidental
to the developmental period. There has been an enormous
selling pressure behind the investment trust movement,

and appeals have been made to every type of investor.
It is to be expected that as the investment trust grows
to maturity there will be a great simplification and
standardisation of the capital structure.
(8) Varieties of management compensation * --
In Great Britain the directors and managers of investment
trusts receive a salary or a fixed fee. But they derive
most of their income through the ownership of stock pur-
chased on the same terms as other shareholders at the
time if issue.
Here again, American practice offers variety.
In the case of the unit-share trusts the organiser-mana-
gers are compensated by a marketing profit. That is,
the certificates of participation are sold to the public
at a price representing the •, arket value of the underlying
securities plus a certain added percentage. From this
percentage the organising group pays all expenses and
derives its business profit. In the case of the trusts
having constant supervision the annual fee is most used.
The trust contracts with a management company which agrees
to supervise the trust portfolio in return for a certain
percentage(usually J- of 1 per cent)of the total fund.
Other methods may be used instead of or in conjunction
with the fee. In some instances managers and promoters
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get a special type of share; in others they may acquire
common stock as a bonus or at a special price; sometimes
they possess the right to subscribe for stock at stated
prices over a period of years. There is no uniformity,
and in this connexion the investor must exercise vigilance.
He rrust watch out to see that managers and organisers do
not receive undue returns at his expense.
Trusts and the Stock Market
Any account of investment trust development
in the United States must consider the influence of the
great stock market boom that began in July, 1927 and
continued practically without interruption until the crash
in October, 1929. In July, 1927 the Federal Reserve Banks
initiated a new policy of low rates, and under the stimu-
lus of easy money there was a great uprush of stock prices
during the second half of the year. Advances in bank
rates and sales in the open-market brought about a mild
recession in the early months of 1928, but by March the
decline had stopped and^led by sensational advances in
Radio and General Motors, a boom developed. From that
time until October, 1929 the market continued merrily
upward. Stock values soared to ridiculous heights, but
the public continued to buy. The enormous volume of pur-
chasing by an optiristic public was the feature of the

"boom. In April, 1928 a writer in the Annalist commented
as follows: "Apparently the whole country had gone on
a wild speculative debauch .... Over the whole range
of the social and financial scale • . • • everyone was
trading in stocks*" It seemed that stock prices would
go upward forever, and new financial prophets arose to
herald the advent of a new era of high stock values. But
it was apparent to any sensible economist or investor
that stock prices had risen beyond reason and that a re-
action was inevitable. Also in April, 1928 Professor
0. M. W. Sprague remarked, "There has certainly been no
change in the prospective earnings of business to provide
support for recent advances . . . • The present security
market exhibits all the familiar earmarks of inflation
and the syrrptoms of a speculative craze. It presents a
situation altogether analagous with that in the commodity
markets throughout the world during the twelve months
preceding the debacle in the Spring of 1920, and not un-
like the Florida land boom of more recent memory." The
market held up longer than anyone expected, but a reaction
was inevitable. It came in October, 1929, in the great-
est stock market crash of history.
What did all this have to do with the invest-
ment trust movement? There are three general relation-
ships:
^Axe, E. W. A Manipulated Stock Il'arket Offers Prospect
of Heavy Loss to the Public" 51 Annalist 688-90 (Apr. 20,
T^28)
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(1) The growth of investment trusts was
greatly stimulated by the rising market.
(2) The purchasings of the trusts reacted
upon the market itself.
(3) The crash furnished a severe test for
the trust managements.
Investment trusts in America had a sensational
growth during 1928 and 1929. It seems certain that the
extraordinary nature of this growth was due to the rising
markets of those years. The public was crazy to buy; it
would buy almost anything at all. Sales resistance was
low, making the flotation of investment trust securities
comparatively easy. Companies were formed by the dozens,
and their offerings were immediately snatched up. The
Commercial & Financial Chronicle gives a grand total of
all new capital flotations in 1929 as $11,604,174,955, of
which $2,227,730,898 represents investment trusts, trading
companies, and holding companies. The greater part of
the figure was undoubtedly investment trust securities.
The monthly figures show heavy flotations in the first
quarter, a lull during the next, exceedingly large flota-
tions in the three months up to the crash, and a sharp
decline afterwards. The statistics follow:
°^Sprague, 0. M. W. Brokers Loans Dangerous 31 Annalis 1
687, (April 20, 1928)
¥<130 Chronicle 359, (January 18, 1930)
^Ibid.
((
1929
January $ 277,013,500
February 238,748,050
March 179,998,588
April 82,058,000
May 78,206,200
June 73,406,224
July 220,588,090
August 453,727,220
September .... 529,237,100
October 78,637,816
November 3,435,000
December 8,639,110
If the trusts were selling so heavily to the
public they must have done an almost equally large amount
of purchasing themselves. It seems apparent that the in-
vestment trusts exerted a real influence on the bull side,
and it is possible that they were influential in pro-
longing the bull market through 1929. Some have gone so
far as to assert that the investment trusts were respon-
sible for the 1929 market. This can hardly be true. As
large as the investment trust buying was, it was but a
fraction of the total. The trust purchases could not
have supported the arket, let alone force it up. And
it is a known fact that many of the trusts were unloading
during 1929, thus exerting a force in the other direction.
When anything goes wrong there is always a general search
for a goat. The investment trusts have been a favorite.
Their purchases have been blamed for the rise, and their
sales for the crash*
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Just how the trusts weathered the panic is
not known. Those holding large amounts of overvalued
securities were certainly in an uncomfortable position.
Companies having high ratios of fixed-charge securities
and depending on turnover profits to carry them through
were probably hard hit. There were rumors of weak trusts
asking to be bought up by the strong groups. There is no
way of telling just what did happen. The results that
have appeared have been distinctly favorable. Reports
received up to the first of February, 1930 showed that
the bulk of the trust portfolios were in the very best of
common stocks, and that many of the trusts were in a
strong cash position at the time of the break, having
sold out previously at a profit and ready to pick up the
bargains
•
The Immediate Future
It is, of course, not possible to chart pre-
cisely the course of investment trust development in the
coming years, but a number of general predictions seem
warranted:
(1) Growth will be much slower. — The
abnormal stimulus of the rising stock market will be
gone, and the securities of the present trusts have yet
to be entirely absorbed. With profit-taking possibilities
^Cf. Investment Trusts Have Met First Test, 10 Barrons
8, (January b, lyso); and Steiner, w. E. Investment Trusts,
p. 314-6 —
—
1
**Speare, C. F. 130 Chronicle 689, (February 1, 1930)
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scarcer and the public less eager to buy, the investment
trusts will return to a process of slower and more normal
growth.
(2) integration will continue . Many of
the smaller trusts that were able to stand alone during
a period of rising prices will not find things so easy
in an unsettled market. The need for the superior manage-
ment and financial strength of the big groups should bring
many of the smaller trusts into close relationships with
the larger organisations.
( 5 ) Investment policies will be more conser-
vative . — The emphasis of American trust management has
been on turnover profit to the neglect of straight invest-
ment return. With the market in a more normal state, pos-
sibilities of turnover profit will dwindle, and manage-
ments will be glad to look around for profit to be gained
through careful selection for higher yields.
(4 ) Portfolios will show a wider diversifi-
cation . — Although investment opportunities in this
country are still large, the sudden slump in stock prices
is likely to cause many managements to look around to
see if investment opportunities are not to be had else-
where in the world. It also seems likely that trusts
overloaded with high-priced stocks may think it wise to
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buttress their portfolios with a good selection of bonds.
Regulation
Although the investment principles underlying
the investment trust are sound, the device itself is open
to abuse. In a period of rapid expansion and uncritical
purchasing it is comparatively easy to launch fraudulent
schemes in the guise of investment trusts, and it is es-
pecially likely that trusts will be formed under manage*
ment that is well-intentioned, but weak and incompetent.
As far as this writer knows, cases of actual fraud have
been infrequent, and although the number of poorly man-
aged trusts is probably considerable, the real state of
affairs will not be known until all the 1929 statements
are in. But at any rate there has been agitation among
legislators and state security commissioners for laws
that will protect the public from fraudulent and unsound
enterprises
•
Before considering public legislation, however
the attitude of the New York Stock Exchange will be stated
The market for investment trust securities is at present
over-the-counter, but some are found on the Exchange*
and others may follow. It is evidently the desire of the
Stock Exchange authorities to keep the securities of un-
((
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sound trusts off the board, and on June 6, 1929 require-
ments for listing were published . The chief stipulations
are summarised as follows:
(1) Companies applying for listing must be
"engaged primarily in the business of investing and re-
investing in the securities of other corporations for the
purpose of revenue and for profit, and not in general for
the purpose of exercising control."
(2) Companies which apply for listing must
be of the general management type, i. e., constant super-
vision of the portfolio by a management with fairly wide
powers.
(5) The true nature of the management must
be revealed as well as the basis for compensation.
(4) All expenses incurred in selling and
organisation r ust be shown and excessive costs in these
respects will be considered as a bar to listing, as will
also a large unfunded debt.
(5) Trusts with any non-voting stock must
accord to that stock the right to vote when preferential
dividends for one year are in arrears, and such powers
are to continue until the arrears are liquidated. "No
non-voting stock will be listed unless substantially pre-
ferred as to both dividends and assets."
N. Y. Stock Exchange Requirements For Listing
,
1 Keane's investment Trust Monthly b-7 (November, 1929)
(
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(6) Annual statements must be submitted and
must show gross earnings analysed to reveal sources, i.e.,
interest, dividends, profits on sales of securities,
profits from syndicate participations, transfers from
reserves. Only actually realised earnings to be shown,
and stock dividends are not to be considered as income.
(7) Securities rust be valued at cost and
a footnote must show current sales and the difference be-
tween these and costs.
(8) A complete list of holdings, giving names
and quantities must be submitted.
(9) Where there are subsidiaries, a con-
solidated balance sheet and earnings statement must be
shown, as well as a complete statement for each subsidiary
(10) "Applicants must agree not to pay any
cash or stock dividends on common stock, when such divi-
dends, plus any amount by which the value of securities
held shall be less than their cost, exceed the earned
surplus and undivided profits."
These regulations require no comment • They
are quite obviously a stimulus to the growth of soundly
managed trusts and a check to those of doubtful character.
The New York Stock Exchange is a private as-
sociation and can handle its affairs as it sees fit, but
(
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the nature of public regulation relating to investment
trusts is a field of controversy. Public regulation may
proceed along three lines. It may attempt to prevent and
punish fraud in investment activities; it nay force the
publication of such essential information as will enable
investors to reach sound conclusions as to investment
value; and it nay attempt to set up standards of manage-
ment to which investment trusts must conform. This writer
is in accord with the first two objectives, but is opposed
to the third. Every precaution should be taken to prevent
fraudulent enterprises from getting under way, and no
company unwilling to give sufficient information for
sound investment analysis has any economic just if icat ion
for its existence. Eut for the state to prescribe stand-
ards of management is going too far. First, no accepted
standards have been completely developed in the United
States; second, even though there is a trend toward
standardised practice, the science of investment can never
be reduced to rule of thumb; third, the successful admin-
istration of an enterprise in a dynamic economic society
depends in a considerable degree on freedom from hampering
regulation; fourth, conformance to legal requirements is
no guarantee of the integrity of the management, unscru-
pulous managements can do much evil while adhering to the
«-
i
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letter of the law; fifth, conformance to legal require-
ments would tend to be accepted by the public as prima
facie evidence of economic soundness. It may be added
that any regulative measures undertaken by the separate
states would lead to the same sort of thing that has
happened in the case of general corporation laws. Some
states will be lax in their requirements, and there will
be a tendency for trusts to form in the states of the
least restrictions, thus defeating the measures of the
more exacting states. The only real solution would be
a Federal law, but co-operation bet?;een state security
comrrissioners may be of some value in bringing uniformity.
The controversy over regulation assumed
sizeable proportions during 1928 and 1929. In October,
1928 the Committee on Investment Companies reported at
the convention of the Investment Bankers Association of
America as being distinctly opposed to any legislation
that attempted to set up standards or to hamper able man-
agement. It recommended increased powers of investigation
for security commissioners and a substantial measure of
information in prospectuses of investment trusts. The
required information would be:
(1) Complete list of officers and directors.
(2) The outline of the plan of capitalisation
•
;127 Chronicle 40 (July 7, 1928)
*1
1
•
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(5) Whether the securities offered are
secured by any lien or represent rrerely a general debt.
(4) Whether there are in existence any liens
upon the assets.
(5) What restrictions, if any, exist regard-
ing the investment powers of the management.
(6) Whether audited statements will be
published, and, if so, how frequently, and to what extent
information will be released.'
This is quite obviously a conservative stand.
The rules of the California Corporations Commission go to
the other extreme. Some of the chief requirements are
summarised as follows:
(1) Those connected with the business must
qualify as to character and competency.
(2) A complete description of methods of
operation must be submitted.
(5) No limit shall be imposed as to the
scope of diversification.
(4) The funds of the trust are to be confined
exclusively to the investment and reinvestment in securi-
ties that are sound, seasoned and marketable.
(5) Organisers must put up at least 20 per
cent of the initial capital.
(6) Not more than 5 per cent of the invest-
ment fund is to be in the securities of ary one corporationi
^126 Chronicle 3283 (June 2, 1928)
#

or business enterprise.
(7) Not rrore than 20 per cent of trust re-
sources are to be invested in enterprises which have not
been operating successfully for at least three years*
(8) Semi-annual financial statements are to
be issued accompanied by a list of all securities held
at the time and dealt in during the preceding period.
(9) 10 per cent of earnings must be set
aside before dividends until the reserve equals 25 per
cent of paid-in capital.
This subject of regulation will be pursued
no further. For a while it appeared that this controversy
would assume major proportions, but the issue has apparent-
ly subsided. There seem to be four reasons: (1) the
scarcity of really fraudulent schemes, (2) the stock
market break which checked the rapid growth of the trusts,
(3) the successful operation of the majority of the trusts,
and (4) the la->ge amount of essential information fur-
nished by the trusts on their own initiative.
Present state Blue Sky laws should prove
adequate to check worthless and fraudulent ventures.
Severe regulations of the California type lean too far in
the direction of unwise paternalism, and are subject to
criticism on the five points given above. Paternalism
• ^rr*i'3^ &fyx.Qj Jf}&9j «T 3 *X0* ^"Xuti^ ttJof* *) ;J3 ^£Ti jB'X&CJC ClQ&d
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may be an excellent thing in some lines of economic activ-
ity, but not in the field of investment which is vast and
intricate. The only real safeguards here are intelligence
insight, and constant vigilance on the part of the in-
dividual investor. If state pressure is to be brought to
bear at any point, it will probably be most needed in
the matter of requiring publicity. Maybe the leadership
of the better trusts will cause the rest to follow, but
if not, it may be necessary to force delinquents into
line. What the investor needs and wants is not statutory
protection, but a chance to find the facts.
Economic Significance
A consideration of some broader aspects of
the investment trust movement will conclude this paper.
It is apparent that the investment trust has certain
o
merits as an investment device, but has it n*y further
value? Does it contribute anything to general economic
well-being and progress? This writer believes that it
does. It should exert positive economic influence in
three directions:
(1) As a factor making for steadiness in the
stock market. -- Extreme peaks and depressions in the
market are a disturbing influence on business. They are
largely the result of alternate bull and bear stampedes.
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The investment trust should provide a steadying element.
First, impartial investment management is not likely to
be stair peded into unthinking excesses of buying and
selling; and second, clear-sighted management will tend
to unload overvalued securities as a peak is neared and
to make substantial commitments when the market is in a
slump. Thus the trusts will not assist headlong move-
ments in one direction or the other, but will tend to
exert pressure in opposition.
( 2 ) As a factor making for an increase in
the amount of capital . — It is an economic commonplace
that industrial progress is much dependent on an ever
increasing supply of capital goods. The investment trust
should aid accumulation, especially among the classes with
small or moderate income; first, by preventing a waste of
capital, and second, by stimulating thrift. Many millions
of dollars go yearly into fraudulent and doubtful enter-
prises. The small investor has sought a high return, but
there has been little means of getting it outside of
chance-taking in low-grade securities. The investment
trust affords an opportunity for the small investor to
purchase sound securities protected by diversification
and yielding investment profits. With this new channel
opened up, more savings should find their way into pro-

ductive enterprises. At the same time, and for the same
reasons, the investment trust should stimulate some in-
crease in the general volume of savings*
(4 ) As a factor making for a more equitable
distribution of wealth . -- Karl Marx based his whole social
theory on the assumption of an inevitable conflict between
workers and capitalists. With advances in the technique
of production, increasing profits went to the capitalists
while the return to labor was constantly maintained in
the vicinity of the subsistence level. Through the insti-
tution of private property whereby the capitalists con-
trolled the means of production, they occupied a superior
bargaining position and could exploit the worker by forcing;
on them an unfavorable wage contract.
The high wages and wide diffusion of profits
characteristic of the present economic order have largely
confuted the doctrines of Marx, but modem economic
society has yet a long way to go in the matter of distrib-
utive justice. As Professor Dewing has said, "Industry
has been autocratic in its administration and in the dis-
tribution of its profits. The general public has not
participated in the control over the profits of industrial,
railway. and public utility enterprises."
The investment trust enables the wage earners
* Dewing, A. S. Investment Trusts; Effect on the
Public, Boston Transcript, Part II, p. b (April 27, 1929)

and others of moderate means to buy into industry as
creditors and owners. It enables them to share in present
earnings and future increases in those earnings. There
seems every reason to believe that the investment trusts
will bring a still wider distribution of profits than at
the present, and thus prove an important factor in the
attainment of a true industrial democracy.
* * # * #

SUMMARY
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PART I
The investment trust is what its name implies,
a means of investment; that is, of the commitment of
funds to productive enterprises in expectation of moder-
ate, regular return and safety of principal. It is dis-
tinctly not a speculative device nor a means of co-opera-
tive gambling, though there are schemes for such purposes
that have a surface resemblance to genuine trusts.
The elements in the investment return are in-
terest, risk premiums and profits. In order for the risk
premiums to be truly compensatory, it is necessary to
diversify the investment fund, to so spread commitments
that the aggregate lessee are balanced by the aggregate
risk premiums. Profits are the fruit of skilled manage-
ment which uncovers undervalued securities, avoids over-
valued ones, gets into stocks at the bottom of the busi-
ness cycle and into bonds at the top. Also it exercises
vigilance to keep the fund intact, shifting from declining
enterprises and industries to those on the up-grade.
The wealthy investor has a fund large enough
to effect diversification and to command skilled manage-
ment. The small investor has not been able to do so.
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The investment trust affords an opportunity for small in-
vestors to pool their resources and create a large fund
which means safety through diversification and profit
from expert management.
PART II
Great Britain is the home of the investment
trust. In the Nineteenth century that country had a
heavy favorable balance of trade and a large supply of
capital. Foreign yields were attractive, rates at home
were low. After disastrous speculation in the first half
of the century, investment trusts were developed as a
medium of foreign investment, but they were not free from
mismanagement, and it was not until the end of the century
that they reached a sound basis. Since then they have
prospered and multiplied.
British trusts were first organised under
ordinary trust agreements, but were later formed as
joint-stock companies under the Companies Acts.
Management has become sound and conservative,
adhering to the principles of world-wide diversification,
avoidance of over-concentration of funds, avoidance of
controlling interests, and the holding of marketable
securities. The British trusts secure a large part of
their capital from the public sale of debentures which are
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protected by large stock equities. Reserves are built
up, dividend policies are cautious, management expenses
are kept down. The British trusts have proved their worth
by the excellent fashion in which they care through the
crisis of the World War.
PART III
The United States has witnessed an extraor-
dinarily rapid growth of investment trusts within the
past five years. They have not grown up as a means of
foreign investment, but as a channel for domestic commit-
ments. The stimulus to American growth has been the
economic prosperity of recent years. There has been a
great increase in savings, bringing thousands of small in-
vestors into the market. They have been lured by the high
earnings of corporations, but they are lost in the maze of
modern corporate securities. The investment trust has
enabled them to secure the investment guidance and manage-
ment that they need; and the sellers of securities have
been only too anxious to utilise the device.
American finance has developed a diversity of
types. The major classification is between the con-
tractual type in which the portfolio of the trust is
owned directly by the security holders and the statutory
type where the portfolio is owned by the trust, and the
fct
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trust in turn by the security holders.
The contractual type is subdivided into unit-
share and fund types. In the former the security holders
hold pro rata shares in certain specified blocks of secu-
rities which may be redeemed under certain conditions.
The element of management is small. In some the under-
lying securities are never touched, in others there is
some provision for shifting and supervision of the fund.
The fund type is similarly organised, except
that the security holders have pro rata shares in a
general undifferentiated fund instead of in specific
blocks of securities. In the fund type the manager ent
element is usually more pronounced.
The statutory types are generally organised
as ordinary corporations or as Massachusetts trusts. Here
the managenient of the portfolio is continuous, and the
elerrent of managerial discretion large. The trust is
operated in the manner of any ordinary corporation, the
security holders standing in the same relation to the
trust as the stockholders of any industrial corporation.
The trusts of the statutory type have outdistanced those
of the contractual type.
The American development presents the phe-
nomenon of integration. Many companies are found which

own controlling interests in several subsidiaries to
which the parent company furnishes investment service in
return for a fixed fee. The trusts tend to form into
groups knit top-ether by stock control, interlocking di-
rectorates, and investment service contracts.
The American investment trusts present a
number of general characteristics differentiating them
somewhat from the British organisations. These character-
istics are: close relations between many investment
trusts and banking institutions; concentration in groups;
confinement of investment to the domestic field; con-
finement of investment to one or two industries; pre-
dominance of comr on stocks in the portfolios; emphasis on
turnover profits; complex capital structure; and varied
schemes for compensation of management.
The recent stock market boom was an important
factor in the investment trust growth. The rush of
thousands to purchase securities made easy the sale of in-
vestment trust securities.
The crash furnished a severe test for the
trusts, but they seem to have weathered it well. We may,
however, expect a more slow and conservative growth in
the immediate future.
Fear that the trusts would be used to exploit
-rxi lo alsa edi ^a*e ebarrt aelili^oec eeariaiin csbaseuodi
the public has lead to agitation for state regulation.
It seems wise to enforce present Blue Sky laws and to
exact publicity from the trusts, but any attempt to im-
pose precise standards is of doubtful value. The demand
for legislation has somewhat died down with the return of
the trusts to more normal growth.
The investment trust has a general economic
significance; (1) as a steadying force in the stock
market, (2) as a stimulus to capital accumulation, and
(3) as a means of widespread distribution of industrial
profits.
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